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CHILD CUSTODY IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 
Leonard G. Ratner* 
AMONG the most difficult of judicial functions is the determina-tion of a child's custody after its parents have separated. The 
difficulties are acute enough when all the parties remain in the 
same place; when the parties are in different states, an additional 
perplexing problem arises as to which state should have authority 
to make the custody decision. This broad question can be resolved 
into three distinct though interrelated issues: (1) what state may 
initially determine custody; (2) what state may later modify that 
determination; (3) to what extent is such a determination binding 
on other states. 
The Constitution allocates judicial authority among the several 
states primarily through the due process and the full faith and 
credit clauses. In recent years due process requirements for 
the exercise of jurisdiction by state courts, as delineated by the 
Supreme Court, have been concerned not so much with the pres-
ence of the parties or the subject matter of the litigation within 
the territory of the state, as with the fairness to both parties of the 
place of trial.1 The full faith and credit directive has functioned 
to inhibit relitigation of matters once decided and to maintain 
federal unity through nationwide recognition and enforcement of 
state judgments.2 
Distinctive aspects of child custody litigation, however, make 
the application of these constitutional policies more troublesome 
in such cases than in suits for money or other property. Custody 
adjudications always involve the interests of at least three persons; 
the child, although not formally a party, is vitally affected by the 
outcome. Pertinent evidence is usually most accessible in the local-
ity of the child's home, and courts frequently use field investigators 
to unearth it. Custody decrees are modifiable on the basis of a sub-
sequent change in circumstances and in some states on the basis 
• Professor of Law, University of Southern California.-Ed. 
1 Sec EHRENZWEIG, CONFUcr OF LAws, pt. 1, at 88 (1959); Symposium, Jurisdiction; 
Current Problems and Legislative Trends, 44 IowA L. REv. 247 (1959); The Supreme 
Court, the Due Process Clause, and In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts: From 
Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 569 (1958). 
2 Sec Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 
COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1945); articles collected in CHEATHAM, GOODRICH, GRISWOLD & REEsE, 
CONFUCT OF LAWS 250 (1957). 
[795] 
796 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
of prior but unconsidered events as well.3 If the child has left the 
state issuing the decree, the prevailing parent may have to seek en-
forcement in the state where the child is physically present. The 
natural desire for prolonged custody or the acrimony arising from 
the separation may result in frequent attempts by either parent to 
place the child out of reach of the other and in repeated litigation. 
As a result there is little agreement as to the proper basis for 
allocation of custody jurisdiction and the extraterritorial effect of 
a valid decree.4 The courts have not yet articulated a principle 
upon which to base workable, jurisdictional rules that satisfy com• 
munity needs, although such a principle can be derived from those 
needs. 
THE STATE COURT DECISIONS 
In some state court cases the legal presence of the defendant 
provides the basis for initial custody jurisdiction5 in accordance 
with the rule of Pennoyer v. N eff6 that a state may exercise authority 
to decide a case without infringing due process of law when the 
defendant is domiciled, resident, or personally served there.7 
But Pennoyer v. Neff also recognizes jurisdiction based upon 
the presence of a disputed "res," and most courts, as well as the 
first Restatement,8 allocate initial custody jurisdiction to the state 
of the child's domicile when proceedings are begun, regarding the 
status of the child as a "res" there present.9 Since the choice of a 
home, generally the prime ingredient of domicile, cannot ordinarily 
be made by a child, the domicile of one of the parents is usually 
controlling after the separation.10 Many states consider the child 
s See New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947); Sampsell v. Superior 
Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948); REsrATEMENT (SECOND), CoNFLicr OF LAws 
§ 117(b) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1957). 
4 See Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 434 (1950); Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 7 (1949); 53 HAR.v. L. REv. 
1024 (1940); 80 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 712 (1932). 
5 See cases collected in Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 434, 440 n.17 (1950); cf. De La Montanya 
v. De La Montanya, 112 Cal. 100 (1896). See also Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 
763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948). 
6 95 U.S. 714 (1878). 
7 A defendant may also consent to the personal jurisdiction of a court, -usually by 
appearing without objection to jurisdiction, and in some circumstances citizenship may 
provide the basis for such jurisdiction. See EHRENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 1, at 89; 
GooDRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws 195-99 (3d ed. 1949). Adequate notice to the defendant is 
assumed. 
8 REsrATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 117, 145 (1934). 
9 See cases collected in Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 434, 439 n.15, 442 (1950). See also EHRENz-
WEIG, op. cit. supra note 1, at 275; GooDRICH, op. cit. supra note 7, at 421. 
10 See GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 7, at 60, 83, 90; REsrATEMENT (SECOND), CoNFLicr 
OF LAws §§ 9, 15, 30, 32 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954). The Restatement says that "domicile 
is the place, generally the home, which the law assigns a person for certain legal pur-
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to be domiciled with its father; 11 the Restatement prefers the 
domicile of the parent with whom the child is living.12 A number 
of cases, in effect treating the child as the "res," assign custody 
jurisdiction to the state where the child is physically present, be-
cause that state has immediate access to the child and an interest 
in its welfare.13 
These rules are not mutually exclusive. Some states have not 
found it necessary to choose between them and accept jurisdiction 
on the basis of any of the three.14 In Sampsell v. Superior Court15 
the Supreme Court of California declared that two or more states 
have concurrent custody jurisdiction when the child's domicile, 
the child, and the defendant are not in the same place, but that 
one state may abstain in favor of another with a greater interest 
in the child. The tentative Second Restatement has adopted this 
position.16 
The same spectrum of rules is displayed by the state cases deal-
ing with jurisdiction to modify custody decrees, 17 but other factors 
also provide a basis for the exercise of such authority. Continuing 
jurisdiction to modify may sometimes be asserted by the court that 
made the initial decree, 18 and many courts infer jurisdiction to 
poses." Id. § 9. The meaning of the concept varies with the problems to which it is 
relevant, such as jurisdiction of a court, the authority of a state to tax, the right of an 
individual to vote, the proper place for probate. See CooK, LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF 
CONFLICT OF LAws 194-210 (1942); Reese, Does Domicile Bear a Single Meaning?, 55 
CoLUM. L. REv. 589 (1955). 
11 See GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 7, at 90-92; SroMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAws 42 
(lid ed. 1963). 
12 REsrATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 32 (1934); see REsTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT 
OF LAws § 32 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954). After a valid custody decree the child takes the 
domicile of the prevailing parent. See GooDRICH, op. cit. supra note 7, at 421-22; STUMBERG, 
op. cit. supra note II, at 42. 
18 See cases collected in Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 434, 440 (1950); Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 7, 16 
(1949). See also REsTATEMENT (SECOND}, CONFLICT OF LAWS§ ll7 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1957); 
Gillman v. Morgan, 158 Fla. 605, 29 So. 2d 372 (1947); Kovacs v. Brewer, 245 N.C. 630, 
97 S.E.2d 946 (1957). 
14 Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 769, 197 P.2d 739, 743-44 (1948) and 
cases cited therein; see Stansbury, Custody and .Maintenance Across State Lines, 10 LAw 
&: CoNTEMP. PRon. 819 (1944). Compare domicile jurisdictions collected in Annot., 9 
A.L.R.2d 434, 442 (1950), physical presence jurisdictions collected in Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 7, 
16 (1949), and in personam jurisdictions collected in Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 434, 440 n.17 
(1950). 
111 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948), opinion by Traynor, J. See text accompany-
ing note 139 infra. 
10 REsTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § ll7 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1957). 
17 See cases collected in Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 434, 453-57 (1950); Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 7, 
32-35, 41-64, 85-95 (1949). 
18 See cases collected in Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 434, 457-58 (1950); Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 7, 
35-41 (1949); GooDRICH, op. cit. supra note 7, at 423-24; Stansbury, supra note 14, at 825, 
8!12. 
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modify an out-of-state decree from jurisdiction to enforce it.10 
Interstate recognition of valid foreign custody decrees is cor-
respondingly variable. Most states extend full faith and credit or 
comity to such decrees by enforcing them without relitigating the 
issues and by considering modification, if requested, only on the 
basis of subsequent events or prior events not presented to the ini-
tial court.20 But some courts deny full faith and credit to such de-
crees in proceedings to enforce or modify them, by read judicating 
the previously litigated facts.21 The state where the child is phys-
ically present often asserts a predominant interest in the child's 
welfare as justification for such relitigation,22 and under the Samp-
sell concurrent jurisdiction rule a state with authority to deter-
mine custody is expected to give "respectful consideration" to a 
valid prior decree but remains free to relitigate the entire matter.23 
A manifest weakness of the "no full faith and credit" view is 
avoided by the courts that enforce foreign custody decrees without 
relitigation or modification when the losing parent holds the child 
in defiance of the decree and thus lacks "clean hands."24 Many of 
these courts, however, improvising a further variation on the 
theme, allow a winner who has brought the child into the jurisdic-
tion in violation of the loser's visitation rights, to relitigate a sub-
sequent modification by the initial forum giving the loser cus-
tody.20 
THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
The foregoing medley of discordant decisions provides neither 
a consistent set of rules nor an intelligible guide for those who 
19 See cases collected in Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 7, 41-42, 43-47, 93-95 (1949). 
20 See cases collected in Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 434, 454-57 (1950); Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 
7, 41-42, 54 (1949); Annot., 160 A.L.R. 400 (1946); Annot., 116 A.L.R. 1299 (1938); Annot., 
72 A.L.R. 441 (1931); Annot., 20 A.L.R. 815 (1922). See GooDRICH, op. cit. supra note 7, 
at 422-23; STUMBERG, op. cit. supra note 11, at 322; R:EsrATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS 
§ 147 (1934); cf. EHRENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 1, at 281-93; Stansbury, supra note 14, at 
828; R:EsrATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 117 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1957). 
21 See cases collected in EHRENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note I, at 284-85; Stansbury, 
supra note 14, at 829 n.75; Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 7, 11 n.2 (1949). A number of cases that 
permit relitigation of issues previously decided do so on the ground that the previous 
court lacked jurisdiction to make the decree. See cases collected id. at 64-78. None of 
these cases hold that full faith and credit may be denied a valid foreign custody decree. 
Cf. EHRENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 1, at 283. 
22 See cases cited note 21 supra. 
23 Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 779, 197 P.2d 739, 750 (1948). See 
Stansbury, supra note 14, at 830-31; R:EsrATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 117 
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1957). 
24 See cases collected in EHRENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 1, at 286-90; Annot., 4 
A.L.R.2d 7, 48 (1949); Annot., 107 A.L.R. 642 (1937). 
25 See cases collected in EHRENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 1, at 291. 
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must resort to institutional settlement of custody disputes. Since 
the issues presented arise under the federal constitution, only the 
Supreme Court can authoritatively resolve them. That Court has 
dealt with the interstate child custody problem in four cases, and 
it seems safe to say that they have not abated the dissonance. 
The Assumptions of Halvey 
In New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey26 the Court declined an 
opportunity to clarify some of the basic problems of multi-state 
custody jurisdiction and in the exercise of judicial restraint de-
cided to decide as little as possible. In that case the mother took 
the child from the family home in New York to Florida and after 
about a year27 filed suit there for divorce and custody. The father 
served by publication, did not answer but took the child back to 
New York the d~y before entry of a default decree in favor of the 
mother.28 When she claimed the child by habeas corpus, the New 
York courts modified the Florida decree by giving the father visita-
tion rights and possession of the child during vacations.29 
The Supreme Court assumed that Florida had initial custody 
jurisdiction, refused to consider the effect of the full faith and 
credit clause on custody decrees, and purported to decide only 
that since Florida law permitted modification on the basis of facts 
not previously evaluated, New York did not offend full faith and 
credit by modifying on the basis of the father's evidence, which 
had not been presented to the Florida court because he did not 
appear there. 
But Halvey may have decided more by implication than by 
explication. The holding that full faith and credit could not pre-
vent New York from modifying in accordance with Florida law 
implies that New York had due process jurisdiction to modify the 
decree.30 The Court, however, said nothing specific about jurisdic-
tion to modify except the following: "In this case the New York 
court, having the child and both parents before it, had a full hear-
ing and determined that the welfare of the child and the interests 
of the father warranted a modification of the custody decree."31 
This sentence suggests that the presence of both parents and the 
20 330 U.S. 610 (1947). 
27 See New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 185 Misc. 52, 55 N.Y.S. 761 (1945). 
28 See note 61 infra. 
29 The New York decree also required a $5,000 bond from the wife to insure com, 
pliance. 330 U.S. 610, 612 (1947). 
so See quotation in text accompanying note 170 infra. 
31 330 U.S. 610, 615 (1947). 
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child before the New York court gave it modification jurisdiction. 
But the conclusion is not obvious. 
If, after abducting the child, the father had initiated proceed-
ings in New York to modify the Florida decree with service upon 
the mother in Florida, would the New York court then have had 
jurisdiction to modify the Florida decree on grounds permitted by 
Florida law? The opinion does not answer this question, but if the 
answer is no,32 should the mother be in a worse position because 
she must ask for habeas corpus in New York to enforce the Florida 
decree? True, she invokes the authority of the New York court, but 
to enforce, not to alter, a valid decree. Can New York compel her 
to submit to a modification of the decree as a condition to enforc-
ing it? Of course, the mother's removal of the child to Florida from 
New York without the father's consent raised a question as to 
Florida's initial jurisdiction and had a bearing upon New York's 
authority to modify the Florida decree, but the Court did not dis• 
cuss these matters. 33 
Some such misgivings are reflected in the comment of Justice 
Rutledge, concurring dubitante: 
"The result seems unfortunate in that, apparently, it may 
make possible a continuing round of litigation over custody, 
perhaps also of abduction between alienated parents. That 
consequence hardly can be thought conducive to the child's 
welfare .... The effect of the decision may be to set up an un-
seemly litigious competition between the states and their re-
spective courts as well as between parents. Sometime, some-
how, there should be an end to litigation in such matters.''34 
Justice Frankfurter, also concurring, felt that "a court 
which can actually lay hold of a child" may modify a custody de-
cree but only on the basis of changed circumstances, not by sub-
stituting "its own view of what custody would be appropriate."35 
Finding no assurance in the record that Florida had jurisdiction 
32 The Supreme Court later gave a negative answer to the question in May v. Anderson, 
345 U.S. 528 (1953). See text accompanying note 43 infra. Since the child took its mother's 
domicile after a valid Florida decree in her favor (see note 12 supra), the cases resting 
custody jurisdiction on domicile (see note 9 supra) also answer in the negative as, in 
effect, do the cases that deny relief to an abducting parent because he lacks clean 
hands. See note 24 supra. 
33 Justice Jackson, however, concurred in the result on the ground that Florida lacked 
initial custody jurisdiction. 330 U.S. 610, 616 (1947). 
34 330 U.S. 610, 619-20. 
35 330 U.S. 610, 617. 
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to make the initial decree or that the New York modification was 
not permitted by Florida law, he accepted the validity of the New 
York judgment. 
The Ambiguity of Kovacs 
The court's modus operandi in Kovacs v. Brewef&6 was a rep-
lica of that employed in Halvey. The child had lived in North 
Carolina with its paternal grandparents for three years, pursuant 
to a valid New York custody decree, when the mother petitioned 
for modification in New York. After a hearing in which the father 
and grandfather contested without objection to jurisdiction, the 
court modified the decree to give the mother custody.37 The child, 
however, was kept in North Carolina contrary to the decree, and 
fourteen months later the mother brought enforcement proceed-
ings there. The North Carolina courts, after considering both sub-
sequent and previously litigated events, decided that the child 
should remain with the grandparents. 
The Supreme Court neither affirmed nor reversed. It held on 
the authority of Halvey that full faith and credit would not fore-
close a North Carolina modification based on a subsequent change 
in circumstances, as permitted by New York law, and remanded 
to the state court for clarification as to whether the modification 
rested on both prior and subsequent events or solely on the latter. 
Left unanswered was the question whether the full faith and credit 
clause forbade North Carolina to take the prior circumstances into 
account.38 Justice Frankfurter, having altered his Halvey posi-
tion, dissented from the implication he found in the majority 
opinion that the New York decree was entitled to full faith and 
credit in the absence of changed circumstances and asserted that 
the state where the child is physically present can decide its custody 
without being bound by a prior decree. 
As in Halvey, the Kovacs opinion, while purporting to do no 
more than avoid a definitive statement on the protection afforded 
custody decrees by the full faith and credit clause, implied with-
out discussion that North Carolina had due process jurisdiction to 
modify the New York decree in the enforcement proceedings. 
86 356 U.S. 604 (1958). 
87 Defendants were thus probably foreclosed on two grounds from collaterally attack-
ing jurisdiction: (a) consent (b) res judicata. See Baldwin v. Iowa State Travelling Men's 
Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931). But cf. Kovacs v. Brewer, 245 N.C. 630, 97 S.E.2d 96 (1957). 
38 See quotation note 170 infra. 
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The Blandness of Ford 
A similar pattern was followed in Ford v. Ford,39 which added 
nothing to the confusion. When the mother removed the chil-
dren from the family home in North Carolina to Virginia, the 
father petitioned for custody in the latter state.40 The parents then 
reached an agreement giving custody to the father for the school 
year and to the mother during vacations. On the basis of this ar-
rangement, the Virginia court dismissed the proceedings. Nine 
months later the mother asked for custody in South Carolina shortly 
after taking the children there during summer vacation; the father 
contested without objection to the jurisdiction. The lower court 
found no change in circumstances but refused to treat the Virginia 
dismissal as a res judicata order fixing custody in accordance with 
the agreement and gave the children to the mother for the school 
year and to the father during vacations. The state supreme court 
reversed on the ground that the dismissal order was res judicata in 
Virginia in the absence of changed circumstances and therefore en-
titled to full faith and credit in South Carolina. 
The United States Supreme Court did not have to decide 
whether the dismissal order would have been entitled to full faith 
and credit if made res judicata by Virginia law. Noting that pri-
vate agreements are not controlling in custody proceedings, it 
concluded that Virginia would not treat the order as res judicata 
because neither the evidence, the agreement, nor the welfare of the 
child had been considered by the court and held that South 
Carolina therefore could make an independent custody determi-
nation.41 
The Court again had no difficulty in avoiding a consideration 
of the effect of full faith and credit on custody decrees and was 
89 371 U.S. 187 (1962). 
40 See Ford v. Ford, 239 S.C. 305, 307-08, 123 S.E.2d 33, 34 (1961). 
41 South Carolina's enforcement of the Virginia judgment on the basis of the full 
faith and credit clause presented a federal question reviewable by the Supreme Court 
on certiorari. See 28 u.s.c. § 1257(3) (1958); ROBERTSON & KIRKHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE 
SUPREME CouRT OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 15, 16, 59 (2d ed. 1951). In resolving suclI a 
question the Court will, when appropriate, independently determine the res judicata 
effect of the judgment under the law of the state that made it. See Barber v. Barber, 
325 U.S. 77, 81 (1944); Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 64 (1938). The South Carolina court 
cited a number of Virginia cases in support of its conclusion that an agreed-upon dis-
missal order was res judicata in Virginia, but none of them involved a custody decree 
(see Ford v. Ford, 239 S.C. 305, 123 S.E.2d 33 (1961)) while other cases suggested that 
Virginia policy would not permit parents to foreclose by contract an adjudication of 
custody based upon the cliild's best interests. Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 192-93 (1962); 
cf. Comment, Ford v. Ford: Full Faith and Credit to Child Custody Decrees1, 73 YALE 
L.J. 134 (1963). 
1964] CHILD CUSTODY 803 
saved from exammmg the due process requirements for initial 
custody jurisdiction by the father's acquiescence in the jurisdiction 
of the South Carolina court.42 
The May Coalition 
May v. Anderson,43 which chronologically followed Halvey, 
purported to decide the question of initial custody jurisdiction left 
open in Halvey, but in fact decided very little. After the mother 
had declared her intention to keep the children in Ohio where she 
had temporarily taken them, the father obtained a custody decree 
in Wisconsin, the state of the family home, and retrieved them. 
The mother, personally served in Ohio, did not appear in the 
Wisconsin action. Five years later she retained the children after a 
visit, and the father petitioned in Ohio for habeas corpus, relying 
on the Wisconsin decree which, under Ohio law, could not be 
modified in such proceedings. The Ohio courts gave full faith and 
credit to the Wisconsin decree and returned the children to the 
father. 
The Supreme Court reversed, dividing four ways. "The narrow 
issue ... presented," said Justice Burton for a plurality of 
four, "was noted but not decided in Halvey v. Halvey .... [W]e 
have before us the elemental question whether a court of a state, 
where a mother is neither domiciled, resident nor present [i.e., Wis-
consin] may cut off her immediate right to the ... custody ... of 
her minor children without having jurisdiction over her in per-
sonam. "44 
The answer, surely predictable from the tautological ques-
tion: 45 Wisconsin could not cut off "rights far more precious than 
property rights"46 without "in personam" jurisdiction over the 
wife based upon her domicile, residence, or presence. Necessarily, 
Ohio owed no full faith and credit to a decree issued without juris-
diction. The domicile of the children, even if with the father, 
said Justice Burton in closing, "does not give Wisconsin, certainly 
as against Ohio, the personal jurisdiction that it must have in order 
42 Of course, the prior Supreme Court cases provided no basis for attacking the 
jurisdiction on due process grounds. 
48 345 U.S. 528 (1953). 
44 Id. at 532-33. 
411 Conventionally, the term "in personam jurisdiction" has been equated with the 
domicile, residence, or service of the defendant in the forum state, in the absence of 
consent. 
46 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953). 
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to deprive their mother of her personal right to their immediate 
possession. "47 
Justice Frankfurter, in a volte face from his position in 
Halvey, concurred on the ground that a state having a child "within 
its borders" may enforce a valid custody decree on comity grounds 
but is not compelled to give it full faith and credit, because the in-
terest of that state in the welfare of the child overrides the "inter-
est of national unity that underlies the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause." He undertook, further, to state the true meaning of the 
Burton opinion, declaring: "What is decided-the only thing the 
Court decides-is that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not 
require Ohio, in disposing of the custody of children in Ohio, to 
accept, in the circumstances before us, the disposition made by 
Wisconsin. "48 
But Justice Jackson, dissenting with Justice Reed, viewed the 
Burton opinion as necessarily holding that Wisconsin lacked due 
process jurisdiction over the mother. "The Court," he stated, 
"apparently is holding that the Federal Constitution prohibits 
Ohio from recognizing the validity of this Wisconsin divorce 
decree. . . . If Wisconsin has rendered a valid judgment, the Con-
stitution ... requires every state to give it full faith and credit. The 
only escape from obedience lies in a holding that the judgment 
rendered in Wisconsin is void and entitled to no standing even in 
Wisconsin. It is void only if it denies due process of law."49 
Expressing fears that "this decision will author new confusions," 
Justice Jackson insisted that Wisconsin, the children's dom-
icile, was primarily concerned with their welfare and had made 
a valid decree entitled to full faith and credit. "If our federal sys-
tem is to maintain separate legal communities," he observed, "there 
must be some test for determining to which of these a person be-
longs. If for this purpose there is a better concept than domicile, 
we have not yet hit upon it." He pointed out that under the plu-
rality holding Wisconsin could not bind the mother and Ohio 
could not bind the father, emphasized "the claim of the children ... 
to have their status determined with reasonable certainty, and to 
be free from an incessant tug of war between squabbling parents," 
and he objected to placing the convenience of a departing parent 
47 Id. at 534. 
48 Id. at 535. 
49 Id. at 537. 
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over a child's welfare. The Frankfurter position, he thought, "re-
duce[s] the law of custody to a rule of seize-and-run."50 
In the view of Justice Minton, also dissenting, the mother 
had challenged the enforceability in Ohio of the Wisconsin decree 
but not the jurisdiction of the Wisconsin court; he therefore as-
sumed the validity of the decree but, unlike Justice Frankfurter, 
concluded that it was entitled to full faith and credit. Justice Clark 
did not participate in the decision. 
Despite Justice Frankfurter's exegesis, the plurality opin-
ion appears dedicated to the proposition that custody jurisdiction 
can be acquired only by a state where the defendant is domiciled, 
resident, or personally served.151 Justice Burton defines the "ele-
mental question" not in terms of full faith and credit but in 
terms of jurisdiction to cut off custody rights-rights more pre-
cious than property. A quotation from Baker v. Baker, Eccles & 
Co.152 attests that "it is now too well settled to be open to further 
dispute that ... a judgment in personam [is not entitled to full 
faith and credit if] it was rendered without jurisdiction over the 
person sought to be bound."53 Estin v. EstinM and Kreiger v. Krei-
ger,515 also cited, denied full faith and credit to alimony provisions 
in Nevada divorce decrees because Nevada lacked "power" and 
"jurisdiction" to make a property disposition binding on a non-
present spouse and relied on Pennoyer v. Neff56 and New York 
Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy,157 both concerned with the due process 
requirements for jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants. 
There remains Justice Burton's curious closing statement 
that even if Wisconsin were the children's domicile, it would not 
have, certainly as against Ohio, the jurisdiction to deprive the 
mother of possession. But it is difficult to derive from those four 
words the new and significant constitutional rule that a custody 
decree, though meeting due process requirements, need not be 
given full faith and credit if the defendant was not "present" in the 
state. 
The plurality decision can perhaps be confined on the facts to 
r;o Id. at 539-42. 
151 Sec Currie, Justice Traynor and the Conflict of Laws, 13 STAN. L. REv. 719, 766-70 
(1961); Hazard, May v. Anderson: Prelude to Family Law Chaos, 45 VA. L. REv. 379 (1959). 
152 242 U.S. 394, 401 (1916). 
153 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953). 
154 334 U.S. 541 (1948), 
1515 334 U.S. 555 (1948). 
156 See note 6 supra. 
157 241 U.S. 518 (1916). 
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the narrower holding that a state may not adjudicate the custody 
rights of a defendant parent who is not "present" and has posses-
sion of the child, 58 but the language is not so limited. The "right 
to custody" is declared to be "a personal right entitled to at least 
as much protection as [the] right to alimony," which a court lack-
ing in personam jurisdiction "is powerless to cut off."59 No distinc-
tion is made between a defendant parent who possesses the child 
and one who does not. Instead the issue is identified with the ques-
tion left open in Halvey "whether in absence of personal service 
the Florida decree of custody had any binding effect on the [ non-
resident] husband,"60 the child in that case having been in the pos-
session of the plaintiff mother when the custody action was filed.61 
The ambiguous rationale of the plurality opinion thus ap-
parently limits custody jurisdiction to a state where the defendant 
is legally present.62 But only half of the participating Justices took 
58 See Hazard, supra note 51; cf. De La Montanya v. De La Montanya, 112 Cal. 101 
(1896). 
59 345 U.S. 528, 534 (1953). 
60 Id. at 532-33. 
61 The child was removed by the father the day before the decree (see text accom-
panying notes 26-28), but it is well settled that custody jurisdiction once obtained cannot 
be defeated by removal of the child from the state before judgment. See cases collected in 
Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 7, 80 (1949). The plurality opinion in May makes no reference to the 
last minute removal of the child in Halvey and gives no indication that such removal has 
any bearing on the jurisdictional issue. 
62 Domicile and physical presence of the child appear to be rejected as alternative 
bases for jurisdiction. Presumably the "no jurisdiction" answer of the plurality opinion 
would apply to the Florida decree in Halvey despite the physical presence of the child 
in that state when proceedings were begun. See note 61 supra &: accompanying text. 
See also Justice Jackson's comment in his May dissent that under the plurality opinion 
"the Wisconsin courts cannot bind the mother and the Ohio courts cannot bind the 
father." 345 U.S. 528, 539 (1953). 
A footnote to the May plurality opinion states: "The instant case does not present 
the special considerations that arise where a parent . . . leaves a jurisdiction for the 
purpose of escaping process or otherwise evading jurisdiction, and we do not have here 
the considerations that arise when children are unlawfully or surreptitiously taken by one 
parent from the other." Id. at 535 n.8. No affirmative indication is given as to the effect 
of such considerations on custody jurisdiction, and no inference in this regard appears 
warranted, particularly because: (a) The May case, itself, seems to have involved a kind 
of surreptitious removal of the children. As pointed out by Justice Jackson, dissent-
ing: "The Ohio court specifically found that [the mother] brought the children to 
Ohio with the understanding that if she decided not to go back to Wisconsin the 
children were to be returned to that state. In spite of the fact that she did decide [in 
the same month that she left] not to return, she kept the children in Ohio." Id. at 538. 
(b) The Halvey case permitted an abducting parent to obtain a modification in the state 
where the child was taken and May cites Halvey with apparent approval. (c) Since a 
parent who departs in the aftermath of a marital dispute can not ordinarily be charged with 
"escaping process or .•• evading jurisdiction" of a court before a suit is filed, this 
reference constitutes little more than an affirmation of the well settled rule that the 
defendant's departure from the state after an action has been filed need not defeat custody 
jurisdiction. See cases cited in Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 434, 446-47 (1950); Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 7, 
31-32, 68, 79-85 (1950). (d) Removal of the child before suit is not usually "unlawful" be• 
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this view. Justices Jackson and Reed rejected it outright. Justice 
Frankfurter necessarily rejected it by recognizing the due process 
validity of the Wisconsin decree and the unfettered custody author-
ity of the state where a child is physically present. Justice Minton's 
assumption was contrary to it. On the issue of whether a valid cus-
tody decree is entitled to full faith and credit, three dissenting 
Justices said yes, one concurring Justice said no, and the plurality 
of four expressed no discernible opinion.63 
THE PRINCIPAL POSITIONS ON CUSTODY JURISDICTION 
From the Supreme Court cases, the state cases, the Restatement, 
and commentary emerge the following views on the allocation of 
authority to determine custody. 
The Tentative Supreme Court Position. A state where the 
defendant is domiciled, resident, or personally served may make 
or modify a custody decree.64 A decree may also be modified by a 
state requested to enforce it and perhaps by the state that initially 
made it. The protection afforded a custody decree by the full faith 
and credit clause is uncertain. 
The First Restatement-Jackson Position. The state of the 
child's domicile may make or modify a custody decree, the child 
taking the domicile of the possessing parent at the time of the 
initial proceedings and of the prevailing parent thereafter.65 Per-
haps a decree may also be modified by a state requested to enforce 
it66 or by the state that initially made it.67 A valid custody decree 
cause in most states either parent has a right to possession of the child until a custody 
order has been made; only a removal in violation of such an order is "unlawful." See 
!19 AM. JuR. Parent and Child § 8 (1942). Therefore, the reference to an unlawful taking 
probably does not relate to a removal of the child at the outset of the custody dispute; 
the meaning with regard to an abduction after a decree is obscure in the light of Halvey. 
(e) Whatever the meaning of "surreptitious" in view of the May facts and the Halvey 
decision, no basis is provided for reconciling the vague intimations of the footnote with 
the premise of the opinion that custody jurisdiction depends on the legal presence of 
the defendant. 
63 The negative argument that the Court need not have decided the jurisdictional 
issue if the Wisconsin decree were not entitled to full faith and credit is countered by 
the negative argument that the Court had no need to decide the full faith and credit 
issue if the Wisconsin court lacked jurisdiction. 
64 Consent provides an additional basis for jurisdiction. See also text accompanying 
notes 58-62 supra. 
615 See notes 11, 12 supra. 
66 Justice Jackson concurred only in the result in Halvey, on the ground that Florida 
lacked initial custody jurisdiction. Justice Reed joined the majority in both Halvey and 
Kovac.s. The first Restatement did not deal with this question. 
67 See R=ATEMENT, CoNFLicr OF LAws §§ 76, 105 (1934). 
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is entitled to full faith and credit; matters previously decided may 
not be relitigated in proceedings to enforce or modify it.68 
The Frankfurter-Physical Presence Position. The state where 
the child is physically present has primary authority to make or 
modify a custody decree, although a state where the child is dom-
iciled69 or the defendant is legally present may also have due proc-
ess jurisdiction. The state where the child is present need not give 
full faith and credit to a foreign custody decree but may enforce 
it on comity grounds. 
The Sampsell-Second Restatement Position. The state where 
the child is domiciled, the state where the child is physically pres-
ent, and the state where the defendant is legally present have con-
current authority to make or modify a custody decree, but one 
state may defer to the authority of another with a more substantial 
interest. Perhaps the state that initially made a decree may also 
modify it.70 The child's domicile at the time of the initial proceed-
ings is probably with either the father or the possessing parent, 
depending on the law of the forum, 71 and with the prevailing 
parent thereafter.72 Custody decrees need not be given full faith 
and credit, but a state should give respectful consideration to the 
decision of another state and may enforce it on comity grounds. 
THE IMPORTANT OBJECTIVES IN ALLOCATING 
CUSTODY JURISDICTION 
Evaluation of these positions requires a statement of the goals 
to be achieved by resolution of the interstate custody problem. A 
meaningful choice cannot be made without a comparison of the 
social consequences likely to ensue from the alternative solutions. 
In defining authority to determine custody the following values 
are significant, though they differ in importance and concomitant 
attainment of all may not be possible. 
First. The place of trial should be fair to the litigants. Fair 
venue depends upon the accessibility of the tribunal to the parties, 
the accessibility of the evidence to the tribunal, and the expecta-
tions of the parties as to the place of litigation.78 Since the tribunal 
68 Id. § 147. 
69 The domicile may probably be that of either the father or the possessing parent 
at the time of the initial proceedings and of the prevailing parent thereafter. 
70 REsrATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 117(b) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1957). 
71 See Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 773-74, 197 P .2d 739, 746-47 (1948). 
72 See note 12 supra. 
78 Accessibility of the tribunal to the parties involves such factors as expense and 
difficulty of reaching the venue, difficulty of obtaining and communicating with a lawyer 
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will almost certainly be more accessible to one party than to the 
other when they are widely separated, its location should not be 
subject to the arbitrary control of either. 
Second. The welfare of the child is the first consideration in 
determining its custody; the natural desire of the parents to enjoy 
its society and participate in its upbringing is the second.74 An 
effective custody disposition requires an evaluation of the child's 
physical, emotional, and educational needs and the capacity of each 
parent to satisfy them. This determination should, wherever feasi-
ble, be made by the court most likely to decide correctly, i.e., by 
the court having maximum access to the relevant evidence. A 
court's access to the relevant evidence is increased when most of 
the witnesses and pertinent physical locations are in the vicinity of 
the court and when evidence and arguments are presented on be-
half of each party in an adversary proceeding. 
Third. Issues resolved in a fair hearing should not be redeter-
mined in another forum. Relitigation is destructive of the emo-
tional and environmental stability important to the child's wel-
fare, 75 wasteful of private and public resources, and inimical to 
the reasonable expectations of the initially prevailing party. For 
the same reasons, constant attempts to modify a custody decree 
should be discouraged. 
Fourth. The factors that make repeated litigation undesirable 
suggest that two courts should not concurrently determine custody. 
After custody proceedings are initiated in a court with jurisdic-
tion, no other court should exercise such authority. 
Fifth. Respect by officials and residents of each state for the 
authoritative institutional decisions of other states and cooperation 
between officials in adjusting the rights and obligations of persons 
living in different states are necessary to the effective adjudication 
of child custody in a federal system. 
at the venue, familiarity with the laws and customs of the venue, and these factors turn 
upon the nature and extent of the contracts with the venue and activities carried on 
there by the parties. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Fisher Governor Co. v. 
Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 222, 347 P .2d 1 (1959). Compare the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens: Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); EHRENZWEIG, CoNFUCT OF LAWS 
120-21 (1959). The requirement of an impartial tribunal is here assumed to be met in all 
cases. 
74 See Frazier v. Frazier, 109 Fla. 164, 169, 347 So. 464, 466 (1933); REsTATEMENT 
(SECOND), CONFUCT OF LAws § 117(a) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1957); STUMBERG, CoNFUCT OF 
LAws 321 (3d ed. 1963); Rheinstein, Jurisdiction in Matters of Child Custody, 26 CONN. 
B.J. 44, 63-65 (1952). 
7li See Stansbury, Custody and Maintenance Across State Lines, 10 LAw &: CoNTEMP. 
PROB. 819, 829 (1944); STUMBERG, op. cit. supra note 74, at 323. 
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Sixth. Removal of the child by either parent in disregard of 
the rights of the other and abduction or retention of the child by 
either parent in violation of a valid decree should be discouraged. 
Seventh. In most cases the child should maintain contact with 
both parents. Visitation rights are important and entitled to pro-
tection. 
Eighth. Parents should be able to ascertain with a reasonable 
degree of certainty the tribunals having authority to determine 
custody. 
Ninth. Parents should be encouraged to settle custody disputes 
without litigation and to respect each other's interests. 
Tenth. The state where a child is physically present should 
have authority to protect it against mistreatment or abuse. 
Eleventh. The defendant should have fair notice of custody 
proceedings. Such notice, whenever possible, should be given by 
personal service upon the defendant and in any event by that 
feasible method most likely to come to the defendant's attention.76 
Publication in a newspaper is not sufficient if notice can be sent by 
mail.77 
EVALUATION OF THE PRINCIPAL POSITIONS 
When measured against these values, none of the positions here-
tofore discussed offers a satisfactory basis for allocation of custody 
jurisdiction. 
Initial Custody 
All four positions encourage resort to self help at the outset of 
a custody dispute by placing a parent who removes the child to an-
other state in a strong tactical position. Having gained physical 
custody, such a parent in most instances can either initiate proceed-
ings in the new state or "sit tight," leaving the stay-at-home par-
ent with no recourse other than to litigate in an inconvenient forum 
far from the relevant evidence or to attempt a recapture of the 
child. 
Under the tentative Supreme Court position not only is a stay-
at-home parent's choice of venue pre-empted by the parent who 
departs with the child; 78 apparently even a parent left with the 
76 See McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917); cases collected in Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 
7, 87 (1949); REsrATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 74, 109 (1934). 
77 See Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956); Mullane v. Central Hanover 
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT 
IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 94 (1952); EHRENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 73, at 82. 
78 The departing parent can initiate custody proceedings only where the stay-at-home 
parent is legally present, but the parent with possession of the child is often in no hurry 
to go to court. 
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child must petition for custody where the defendant can be found.79 
The first Restatement gives control of the child's domicile, and 
therefore of the custody venue, to a parent who moves the child 
permanently to another state. If the father's domicile is controlling, 
his migration moves the custody venue whether or not he takes the 
child with him.80 By placing primary authority in the state where 
the child is physically present, the Frankfurter position invites 
removal of the child by a leave-taking parent. If a non-departing 
parent obtains a custody decree in the home state, he may have to 
relitigate the entire matter upon seeking enforcement in the state 
where the child is located. 
The Sampsell-Second Restatement position produces the 
same results. Usually no other state has concurrent jurisdiction 
when a child is taken to a new state by its father, because both 
are domiciled and physically present there.81 If the mother leaves 
with the child, a non-departing father in a father-domicile juris-
diction may obtain a home state decree, but when he petitions for 
enforcement, the state where the child is present can claim a 
paramount interest and, after giving the decree respectful con-
sideration, make a de novo custody determination. When divergent 
parents proceed with separate actions, conflicting decrees may en-
sue as in Stout v. Pate (California)82 and Pate v. Stout (Georgia)83 
where the parties litigated in two states and each decision favored 
the resident parent; the Supreme Court discreetly folded its tent 
and silently stole away.84 But a decree must be enforced in the state 
where the child is located, and therefore under both the Frank-
furter and Sampsell positions that state usually has the last word.85 
70 See text accompanying notes 59-61 supra; cf. note 62 supra. 
so See STUMBERG, op. cit. supra note 74, at 41-42; Pieretti v. Pieretti, 13 N.J. Misc. 
98, 176 Atl. 589 (Ch. 1935). If a motlier moves tlle child from a fatller domicile state to a 
state tllat places tlle child's domicile witll tlle possessing parent, it is not clear which state 
has jurisdiction on tlle basis of domicile. If each may apply its own test of domicile, con-
current jurisdiction is tlle result. Some states apparently assign the child a domicile witll 
tlle "innocent" parent, tllereby requiring an assessment of fault between tlle spouses 
as a preliminary to allocation of custody jurisdiction. See Stansbury, supra note 75. The 
Supreme Court has long since abandoned as unworkable such a basis for divorce juris-
diction. See Williams v. Nortll Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942); Haddock v. Haddock, 201 
U.S. 562 (1906). 
81 The home state would have jurisdiction if tlle departing fatller petitioned tllere 
for custody-an unlikely procedure. 
82 120 Cal. App. 2d 699, 261 P.2d 788 (1953). 
83 209 Ga. 786, 75 S.E.2d 748 (1953). See also Ex parte Peddicord, 269 Mich. 142, 256 
N.W. 333 (1934); Wilson v. Wilson, 136 Va. 643, 118 S.E. 270 (1923). 
84 Cert. denied, Stout v. Pate, 347 U.S. 968 (1954); cert. denied, Pate v. Stout, 347 
U.S. 968 (1954). 
85 See Ex parte Peddicord, 269 Mich. 142, 256 N.W. 333 (1934); Wilson v. Wilson, 
136 Va. 643, 118 S.E. 270 (1923). Sampsell upheld tlle custody jurisdiction of California 
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Of course, the state where a child is physically present has 
an interest in its welfare-an interest which may be shared by sev-
eral states.86 But an interest in the child cannot justify the exercise 
of custody jurisdiction. 87 The court with fullest access to the per-
tinent evidence, and therefore best able to safeguard the child's 
welfare, will not necessarily be in a state where the child is domi-
ciled or present and is not likely to be in a state to which the child 
has just been taken. The interest of such states in the child may 
provide a cogent reason for not exercising jurisdiction. No state is 
interested in providing an unfair or inadequate forum for the deter-
mination of child custody. On the contrary, all states are interested 
in the orderly allocation of jurisdiction to the forum most capable 
of doing justice. 
While every state has authority to protect children there present 
from mistreatment or abuse, such authority need not imply juris-
diction to bind an out-of-state parent by a custody decree.88 If the 
parent present with the child is guilty of mistreatment, the child 
can be taken from that parent in a proceeding by the state. But a 
stay-at-home parent should not be compelled to litigate custody in 
an inconvenient forum that lacks full access to the evidence, 
simply because the parent with the child is subject to control by 
that forum. 89 A petition for custody by the possessing parent on 
the ground that the stay-at-home parent is likely to abuse the child 
need not be considered by the state where the child is located 
as long as the child is in no present danger and another forum is 
better able to make the decision.90 Nor should the absence of the 
child seriously inhibit the exercise of jurisdiction by the latter 
over a mother and child who went from California to Nevada and then to Utah (see 
text accompanying note 139 infra) but if Utah follows the Sampsell rule, the father 
would probably have been better advised to proceed directly in that state. 
86 A state ordinarily has an interest in the custody of a child when the child or one 
of the persons claiming custody resides there. 
87 Comparative state interest is of greater significance in choosing the rules of deci-
sion to be applied in a case with multi-state contacts than in allocating jurisdiction to 
hear it. See note 185 infra. However, a state with no interest in the child should seldom 
exercise custody jurisdiction. See note 115 infra. 
88 See McMillan v. McMillan, 114 Colo. 247, 158 P.2d 444 (1945); Finlay v. Finlay, 
240 N.Y. 429, 431, 148 N.E. 624, 625 (1925); People ex rel. McGrath v. Gimler, 600 N.Y.S.2d 
622 (1946); GooDRICH, CoNFUCT OF LAWS 421 (3d ed. 1949); REsrATEMENT, CONFLICT OF 
LAws §§ 118, 148 (1934). 
89 If the out-of-state parent elects to initiate custody proceedings in the state where 
the child is located, that state would then be an appropriate venue. See text accompanying 
notes 117-19 infra. 
90 See cases cited in note 88 supra. Usually, whatever the contentions, both parents 
are fit to have custody, and the custody determination depends upon which can provide 
the better care. 
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forum. If the court wishes to question the child, the possessing 
parent can be required to bring it to the hearing or suffer an ad-
verse decision. 
Modification 
In the allocation of initial custody jurisdiction the four princi-
pal positions thus do not discourage unilateral removal of the child 
and in many situations they fail to provide a forum fair to both 
parents with maximum access to the relevant evidence. Nor do they 
achieve these goals in allocating jurisdiction to modify custody 
decrees. 
A losing parent is encouraged to remove the child to another 
state in violation of an initial decree if that decree may be modified 
in the second state during proceedings brought by the winner to 
reclaim the child. 91 Even if the second state will modify only on the 
basis of a subsequent change in circumstances, the loser by these 
tactics may, without regard to the expectations or convenience of 
the prevailing parent, obtain a new determination of custody in a 
forum of his own choosing far removed from the relevant evidence. 
Under the Frankfurter and Sampsell positions, the loser can 
also initiate a modification petition in the second state. The first 
Restatement position, however, permits such a petition to modify 
only at the child's domicile with the prevailing parent.92 In most 
instances that domicile provides a fair venue near the pertinent 
evidence, but it may not provide such a venue if the prevailing 
parent has allowed the child to live with the loser for a long period 
or has moved the child to another state in violation of the loser's 
visitation rights, and when a decree divides custody between the 
parents, both the domicile and physical presence rules may en-
courage successive attempts at modification as the custody shifts 
back and forth. Nor is the court that made the original decree per 
sea desirable venue for modification; after the parties have moved 
away, that place of trial may be inconvenient and no longer close 
to the evidence. 
91 The modification jurisdiction of an enforcing court is recognized by the tentative 
Supreme Court position, the Frankfurter position, the Sampsell position, and perhaps by 
the first Restatement position. Some enforcing courts, however, refuse to consider modifica-
tion when the defendant lacks clean hands. See note 24 supra. Criminal prosecution for 
kidnapping is not an appropriate device for dealing with abduction of a child by a 
parent in violation of a custody decree. Nor have contempt proceedings or surety bond 
requirements proved effective in deterring such conduct. See Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 7, 15 
(1949). 
92 Possibly, modification could also be requested in the state that made the prior 
decree. See note 18 supra. 
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Enforcement 
By according full faith and credit to valid custody decrees, the 
first Restatement position prevents a relitigation of issues in 
enforcement and modification proceedings and thus makes abduc-
tion and repeated litigation after an initial decree less attractive. 
The Frankfurter and Sampsell positions produce the opposite 
effect by permitting a trial de novo in the state where the loser 
wrongfully retains the child. If the first ruling is overturned, the 
second round loser can try for a third decision by using similar 
tactics to repossess the child.93 The tentative Supreme Court posi-
tion, by avoiding the full faith and credit issue, also tends to invite 
such conduct by the last loser. 
The no-full-faith-and-credit rule cannot be rehabilitated by a 
clean hands exception that bars an abducting loser from relitigating 
in a second state.94 In the first place, the exception almost swallows 
the rule by requiring interstate enforcement of custody decrees in 
the large number of cases that involve wrongful abduction or 
retention of children. 95 In the second place, the exception is con-
trary to the rule's rationale that the state's interest in the child justi-
fies a de novo determination of custody. The clean hands doctrine 
punishes the wrongdoing parent, but if the "interest" thesis is 
sound, the court should make an independent custody determina-
tion to protect the child regardless of the transgressions of the 
parents.96 In the third place, the exception to the exception, that 
an initially prevailing parent who has moved the child in violation 
of the loser's visitation rights is not barred from relitigating a modi-
fication giving the loser custody,97 is inconsistent with the clean 
hands principle unless visitation rights are so unimportant that 
their impairment is noncontaminating. 
To reconcile the punishment premise of clean hands with the 
interest-in-the-child premise of no-full-faith-and-credit, it has been 
suggested that the clean hands doctrine works in the child's best 
interest because "stability of environment ... in itself is an impor-
tant factor in the welfare of the child."98 But this sound observation 
does not bolster the clean hands exception so much as it undermines 
the rule denying full faith and credit to custody decrees.90 
93 See Stout v. Pate, 120 Cal. App. 2d 699, 261 P.2d 788 (195!!). 
94 See text accompanying note 24 supra. 
911 See cases cited in note 24 supra. 
96 See White v. White, 77 N.H. 26, 86 Atl. ll5ll (191!!). 
97 See text accompanying note 25 supra. 
98 EHRENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 7ll, at 278; Stansbury, supra note 75, at 829. 
99 See STUI\IBERG, op. cit. supra note 74, at ll2ll; 5ll HAAv. L. REv. 1024, 10!!0 (1940). 
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Current Trends and Constitutional Principles 
The position of the Second Restatement probably reflects an 
inclination in the cases and the commentary100 toward the view 
that authority to determine custody may rest with several states, 
each free to accept or decline jurisdiction, to relitigate a prior deci-
sion or adopt it on comity grounds. The amorphous concepts of 
comity and concurrent jurisdiction, however, do not furnish a 
workable basis for allocation of custody jurisdiction. Since their 
application depends upon the unpredictable discretion of the 
courts of each state, they cannot provide a uniform national policy 
where one is badly needed. They promote continuing uncertainty 
in the resolution of custody disputes, continuing insecurity in the 
relationship of the child to its parents, and continuing expense 
to the individuals and the community. In an area characterized 
by interminable litigation, the res judicata policy of full faith 
and credit and the fair venue policy of due process have particular 
relevancy. Protecting the child's welfare requires not an abandon-
ment of these policies but an intelligent application of them. 
Such an application should implement the social objectives here-
tofore discussed. 
THE PRINCIPLE OF THE ESTABLISHED HOME 
What method of allocating custody jurisdiction would maxi-
mize the achievement of those objectives? The court most likely 
to make a correct decision is the court having greatest access to the 
relevant evidence, and that court usually will be located in the 
state where the child has an established home101-an established 
home being the last place where the child has lived with a parent102 
for sufficient time to become integrated into the community. Such 
integration involves becoming familiar with the physical and cul-
100 See EHRENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 73, at 275; Rheinstein, supra note 74, at 44; 
Stansbury, supra note 75. 
101 See STOMBERG, op. cit. supra note 74, at 321. "If the foreign proceedings have 
taken place in the state where the child habitually lives, not necessarily where it is 
technically domiciled, it would seem desirable that other state courts should decline to 
use their power merely because of the temporary presence of the child." Id. at 323. 
"In all of [the cases in which the court has disregarded a foreign decree on the ground 
of a material change in circumstances] which the writer has discovered, an existing 
family unit in the forum state was affected by the litigation .••. " Stansbury, supra note 
75, at 830. See also Langan v. Langan, 150 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1945); authorities cited 
in note 103 infra. 
102 Or with some person acting as parent when a residence for the child is not 
maintained by either parent. 
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tural environment, making close personal attachments, and adjust-
ing to an educational pattern. 
In the vicinity of such an established home should be found 
a substantial number of persons who are familiar with the child 
and its family. A court located there can hear those witnesses and, 
through a field investigation by court officials, also can examine 
the environment in which the child has lived.103 
Initial Custody 
In most cases the established home at the outset of custody 
litigation is at the place where the child last lived with both parents, 
but after the separation and before legal action a child may acquire 
a new established home by living with one parent long enough to 
become integrated into another community. The courts located 
there are then in the best position to ascertain the present needs 
of the child and the present capacity of the parent in possession, 
although facts relating to the capacity of the other parent may be 
somewhat less accessible.104 
The established home of the child also provides a venue which 
in most cases is fair to both parents, not only because the evidence 
is more readily available but also because that location is probably 
accessible to both and each may reasonably expect custody to be 
determined there.105 As long as one parent resides in the state, 
the nonresident is not unfairly inconvenienced by being required 
to litigate where his child has lived for a substantial period and 
where he can anticipate the custody decision will be made. His 
part_icipation or his acquiescence in the maintenance of a home 
for the child provides a significant contact with the state and sug-
gests acceptance of its custody judisdiction.106 
Jurisdiction at the established home minimizes the advantage 
to be gained by taking the child to another state at the outset of 
the custody dispute. Since the non-departing parent may initiate 
proceedings in the home state, the leave-taker cannot control the 
venue. Jurisdiction shifts to the second state only when the stay-
1os Taylor v. Jeter, 33 Ga. 195 (1862); In re Penner, 161 Wash. 479, 297 Pac. 757 
(1931); Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 7, 13-14 (1949). 
104 So, too, after the separation a child might acquire an established home by living 
for a sufficient time with a person exercising parental supervision. 
If a parent moves with the child from one place to another within a state, the state 
may be considered as the community for established home purposes because its courts 
will have greatest access to relevant evidence within the state and the local venue may 
be adjusted on the basis of such access. 
105 See note 73 supra, and cases cited in note 103 supra. 
106 See text accompanying notes 148-51 supra. 
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at-home parent fails to take action for a period long enough to 
permit the child to acquire a new established home.107 
A stay-at-home parent who does not know where the leave-taker 
has gone with the child can file a timely action in the home state 
to establish jurisdiction, deferring personal service until they have 
been located.108 However custody authority is allocated, an abductor 
may try to conceal the location of the child in order to forestall 
action by the other parent.109 When the abductor and the child 
cannot be found until a new established home exists, the goal of 
providing a venue with maximum access to the evidence conflicts 
with the goals of providing a fair venue free from the arbitrary 
control of either party and diminishing the incentives for conceal-
ment of the child. But the latter values appear to outweigh the 
former, especially because substantial evidence usually remains 
available at the first home. The initial state can probably make a 
valid custody disposition after published notice when a departing 
parent has disappeared with the child, 110 but the hearing may well 
be deferred until the child is found since no decree can be enforced 
until then.111 
The concept of the established home thus provides a rational 
principle for allocation of custody jurisdiction, but application of 
the principle to specific situations presents additional problems. 
(I) While in many cases the established home location will be 
obvious, in others it may involve a difficult factual determination. 
The time required for a child to become integrated into a com-
munity on the basis of the factors suggested will vary with the 
107 The usual time lag between filing the action and trial should not operate to 
divest jurisdiction once obtained. When the delay is substantial, a prompt preliminary 
hearing to determine custody pendente lite is usually available. 
108 Service should ordinarily be made by manual delivery or registered mail. See 
notes 76, 77 supra. If the absent parent does not retain possession of the child and 
cannot be located, service on the person with whom the child resides and mailing to 
the last known address of the absentee would probably satisfy due process. 
100 In most cases the stay-at-home parent soon ascertains the whereabouts of the 
departing parent and the child from statements made by the leavetaker before departure; 
knowledge about the leavetaker's family, friends, employment, plans, and personal affairs; 
and subsequent communications from the leavetaker concerning money, property, personal 
effects, and divorce proceedings. 
110 See text accompanying notes 76, 77 supra. 
111 The state where the child is physically present should enforce the decree without 
considering modification if the prevailing parent proceeds promptly to obtain and enforce 
the decree after locating the child. See text accompanying notes 123, 171-76 infra. 
A default decree based on published notice may be justified if the non-departing 
parent may thereby obtain the assistance of law enforcement officials in locating the 
child. See note 121 infra. 
Any proceedings initiated in the second state by the departing parent after creation 
of an established home should be dismissed upon proof of the prior pending action. 
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age and intelligence of the child, the capacity of the parents, and 
the nature of the environment. After the child has resided for 
more than a short period with a parent who has removed it to a 
second state, the identity of the court with custody jurisdiction 
may become uncertain.112 Of course, an aura of unpredictability 
surrounds the judicial application of every rule, and as a basis 
for jurisdiction the established home concept probably creates 
no greater uncertainty than domicile and a good deal less than 
comparative state interest. But the area of uncertainty is reduced 
if the time necessary to create an established home is defined. 
Most American children are integrated into an American 
community after living there six months; consequently this period 
of residence would seem to provide a reasonable criterion for iden-
tifying the established home. While children under two years of 
age do not usually have close friends or an organized pattern of 
education and cannot become as familiar with the environment 
as older children, the doctors, nurses, domestic helpers, baby sit-
ters, neighbors, and visitors likely to become acquainted with a 
young child and its family during half a year probably constitute 
the largest source of evidence relating to its custody. 
(2) If the child has not lived in any one place long enough to 
acquire an established home, the place of the child's last non-
transient abode with both parents is the most significant source 
of evidence about the family and provides a venue convenient at 
least to the stay-at-home parent, free from the arbitrary control of 
either, and probably consistent with their reasonable expecta-
tions.113 
(3) When parents and child leave the established home state 
before the separation and do not thereafter return, the appropriate 
custody venue, until a new established home exists, is probably 
the state of the last non-transient family abode. Although much 
of the relevant evidence may remain in the prior home state, 
more recent evidence about the family is present at the last non-
112 A litigated decision of the jurisdictional question in either state would bind 
both parties, but contradictory default judgments would produce protracted litigation. 
113 If a child born after separation of the parents has no established home when 
custody proceedings are begun, the place of its residence is probably the venue most 
nearly in accord with the reasonable expectations of the parents. Although the mother 
may control the custody venue by removing an unborn child to another state at the 
outset of the marital dispute, a preguant mother is not likely to be strongly motivated in 
her moves by possible future litigation over custody, and no father-child relationship as 
yet exists to be disrupted by the move. The custody of a new-born child will, of course, 
almost always be given to the mother, but determination of visitation rights makes the 
place of trial important to the father. 
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transient abode and litigation there usually better fits the conven-
ience of the stay-at-home parent and the expectations of both. 
(4) But custody should not ordinarily be adjudicated in a state 
where none of the parties resides at the outset of the litigation, 
though it be the state of the established home or the last non-
transient abode: (a) in most cases that venue is inconvenient to 
both parents, although occasionally it may remain congenial to 
a parent in an adjoining state;114 (b) the accessibility of evidence 
in that venue is subtantially reduced by the inhibition upon 
a full adversary presentation that results from the non-residence 
of all the persons involved in the dispute; (c) that state no longer 
has any interest in adjusting the relationship of the parties.115 The 
non-possessing parent may petition for custody in such a state 
before departing or while the possessing parent or the child lives 
there, but when all are gone, the reasonable alternative venue is 
the place where the child resides when proceedings are begun.116 
(5) The question remains whether the parties may consent 
to the exercise of jurisdiction by a court that is not in the established 
home state. A forum selected by one parent and accepted by the 
other without objection provides a venue convenient to both in 
which a full adversary proceeding is likely to occur. Since such 
an adversary proceeding increases the availability of the evidence 
and the probabilities of a correct decision, the same values that 
underlie the established home principle support the jurisdiction 
of such a forum. Consent has long provided a basis for jurisdiction 
over person in conventional two-party litigation;117 in custody 
114 The residence of the child would ordinarily be the most convenient venue to 
the possessing parent, while both of these venues would be inconvenient to a non-possessing 
parent who had moved a substantial distance from the home state. In any event, a 
parent who is left with the child in the home state and then moves to a new state 
probably should not be required to litigate custody in a forum that has become in-
convenient. 
115 It has previously been suggested that a state's interest in a child does not justify 
the exercise of custody jurisdiction. See note 87 supra and accompanying text. It is here 
suggested that the absence of an interest in the child on the part of a state is a significant 
reason why that state should not exercise custody jurisdiction. See note 118 infra. 
116 If the child attends a boarding school or lives temporarily with friends or 
relatives, jurisdiction should remain with the state where the possessing parent con-
tinues to maintain a residence for the child, but if no such residence is maintained, venue 
should be at the place where the child resides with a person acting as parent. 
117 See EHRENZWEIG, op. dt. supra note 73, at 89. A court's jurisdiction over the 
subject matter of litigation (sometimes referred to as the "competency" of the tribunal) 
is generally derived from the state or federal constitution and statutes. State statutes 
or constitutional provisions identify the courts that are authorized to decide cases 
involving the subject matter of child custody. Such subject matter jurisdiction (i.e., 
competency) cannot ordinarily be conferred on a court by consent of the parties. See 
REsTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 7 (1942); EHRENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 73, at 73 n.6, 74, 89 
n.8. The authority of a court to adjudicate rights and obligations relating to a "res" is 
also sometimes called subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 74; cf. note 146 infra. 
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proceedings, too, an effective disposition is likely to result from 
the decision of a court whose authority is recognized by both 
claimants.118 
For the same reasons, the state where the child has been taken 
by a departing parent may properly exercise jurisdiction when, in 
order to expedite proceedings, the stay-at-home parent elects to 
sue there for custody; the venue, being the choice of the plaintiff 
and not reasonably objectionable to the defendant, is fair and 
conducive to adversary presentation.119 
Modification 
The established home principle also provides a workable basis 
for allocating authority to modify custody decrees. Since modifica-
tions are based primarily upon events occurring after the initial 
decree,120 most of the relevant evidence is likely to be available 
at an established home acquired by the child subsequent to that 
decree. The loser cannot automatically change the modification 
venue by removing the child. Such jurisdiction will shift only if 
the prevailing parent takes no action until the child has acquired 
an established home in the second state. When the loser and the 
child cannot be located in time to prevent the creation of such a 
home, 121 the second state should resolve the conflict in values122 by 
returning the child to the prevailing parent without considering 
the loser's request for modification if, under the circumstances, 
the prior home state remains a fair venue for litigating that issue.123 
118 A forum whose jurisdiction depends on consent of the defendant will almost 
always have an interest in the child's custody, because the proceedings will almost always 
be brought in a state where the plaintiff, the defendant, or the child resides. A forum 
that has no connection with the parties or the litigation may reasonably refuse to exercise 
jurisdiction despite the consent of the parties. See note 115 supra. Compare the doctrine 
of forum non conveniens pursuant to which a court with jurisdiction may dismiss an 
action by a nonresident plaintiff against a nonresident individual defendant or a foreign 
corporate defendant based on events occurring out of the forum. See cases and authorities 
collected in EHRENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 73, at 120 nn.l & 2, 121 nn. 5 & 6. 
119 In order to obtain a prompt decision the plaintiff might forego suit in the home 
state because nonresident defendants are usually given a substantially longer time than 
residents in which to answer a complaint. If suit is brought in the home state, an order 
by the court fixing custody pendente lite, after fair notice to the defendant, should be 
given full faith and credit in the state where the child is present. See text accompanying 
notes 156-59 infra. 
120 Some states also permit consideration of any facts not presented to the first court. 
121 The winner usually knows the loser's last residence and place of employment, 
and since abduction in violation of a decree is unlawful, law enforcement officials may 
also assist in locating the child. Criminal prosecution for kidnapping, however, is not 
an appropriate device for dealing with such abductions. See Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 7, 15 
(1949). 
122 See text accompanying notes 109-11 supra. 
123 See Crocker v. Crocker, 122 Colo. 49, 219 P .2d 311 (1950); In re Penner, 161 Wash. 
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Until the child acquires an established home after the decree, 
the state of the decree probably remains the fairest venue in which 
to litigate modification so long as the child resides there or, if the 
loser has wrongfully removed the child, so long as the prevailing 
parent resides there.124 In most cases that state was the established 
home of the child at the time of the decree; its courts have already 
considered matters relating to the child's welfare and have substan-
tial access to evidence relating to changed circumstances; its juris-
diction is not subject to divestment by unilateral action, and an 
absent parent, having previously litigated in the state, is likely to 
retain adequate contacts there for purposes of litigation. But when 
the prevailing parent also leaves without taking action after the 
loser has removed the child, then the state where the child is 
living appears to provide the most reasonable modification 
venue.1215 
The state of the decree probably continues to be the fairest 
venue for modification pending the acquisition of an established 
home when the prevailing parent takes the child to another state 
without express authorization in the decree and thereby impairs 
the visitation rights of a resident loser.126 Such continuing jurisdic-
tion is supported by the factors mentioned above and prods the 
prevailing parent into reaching some agreement with the loser, or 
obtaining a judicial adjustment of competing claims, before mov-
ing away with the child.127 But if the loser does not reside in the 
state of the decree, his visitation rights are not so seriously affected 
by such a move, and with all of the parties gone from that state, the 
new residence of the child and the prevailing parent seems to offer 
the fairest modification venue. 
When the prevailing parent takes the child to another state 
pursuant to express authorization in the decree, the loser's visita-
tion rights are not unfairly impaired because they have been de-
479, 297 Pac. 755 (1931). A stay-at-home parent can file an action for initial custody in 
the home state to establish jurisdiction when a departing parent disappears with the 
child (see text accompanying note 108 supra), but after a decree, the prevailing parent's 
appropriate remedy against an abducting loser ordinarily is to seek enforcement of the 
existing decree in the state where the child is located. See text accompanying notes 171-76 
infra. 
124 Cf. cases cited in note 18 supra. 
1211 By leaving the state of the decree without taking action the prevailing parent in 
effect acquiesces in the jurisdiction of the state where the child resides with the loser. 
See text accompanying note 106 supra and notes 148-52 infra. 
126 Cf. cases collected in Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 434, 457 (1950); Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 7, 
48-49, 93, 95-96 (1949). 
127 With such a move impending, the court might award the loser custody for part 
of the year. 
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fined with reference to such a move; the convenience and expecta-
tions of the parties and the accessibility of evidence as to events 
occurring after the move then point to the new state as the appro-
priate forum until an established home has been acquired.128 
Once an established home exists, the state where it is located 
should retain jurisdiction to modify until a new one is acquired or 
until all of the persons involved are gone.129 In the latter event, the 
fairest modification venue is probably at the last non-transient 
abode of the child and the prevailing parent, 130 but if the prevailing 
parent leaves that state after the loser has removed the child, the 
place where the child resides should provide the venue.181 
Divided Custody 
When a decree divides custody between the parents, 132 the es-
tablished home principle will place modification jurisdiction in 
the state where the child lives for more than half the year unless 
the parent with the shorter period of custody retains the child for 
a total of six months without action by the other. Usually a shorter 
custody period covers school vacations and does not exceed three 
consecutive months. If the shorter period covers four or five 
months, however, perhaps in fairness to the primary parent the 
established home should not change until the child has been re-
tained by the secondary parent at least three months beyond the 
end of the shorter custody period. 
If the decree gives each parent custody for half the time, the 
established home ordinarily will be not in the state where the child 
resides but rather in the state where it last resided. Under such 
circumstances, in order to insure a local venue each parent may be 
tempted to request modification in his own state after a six-month 
period of possession and to retain the child pending a decision. 
This incentive to litigation and wrongful retention can be negated 
by • confining modification jurisdiction in such cases to the state 
128 If the prevailing parent thereafter moves with the child to an unauthorized state, 
the state of the last authorized residence should retain interim authority to modify 
provided the loser resides there; if he still lives in the state of the decree, that state 
should retain such authority for the reasons previously given. Otherwise, the new state 
appears to be the fairest place to litigate modification until an established home is 
created. 
129 Cf. cases collected in Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 7, 85-87 (1949). 
130 Or a person acting as parent when the prevailing parent does not continue to 
maintain a residence for the child. 
131 This may be with the losing parent or with a person acting as parent if the loser 
does not continue to maintain a residence for the child. 
132 See Stansbury, supra note 75, at 822. 
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where the defendant parent resides, unless the child has lived with 
the plaintiff for substantially more than six months. An additional 
period of three months should give the defendant a reasonable 
time in which to act before the plaintiff's residence becomes the 
established home. 
When the custody of the child is divided between the parents 
by agreement rather than by decree, the same jurisdictional prin-
ciples are applicable if one of the parents thereafter requests a 
custody adjudication. Private custody agreements are not binding 
in subsequent judicial proceedings because such arrangements are 
enforceable only when in the best interests of the child,133 but par-
ents should be encouraged to make and respect custody agreements, 
and allocation of jurisdiction on the foregoing basis would discour-
age facile breach. 
AUTHORITATIVE SUPPORT FOR THE 
ESTABLISHED HOME PRINCIPLE 
Although nowhere explicitly adopted, the principle of the es-
tablished home184 is implicit in many of the decisions that accept 
one or another of the conventional bases for custody jurisdiction; 
in fact, it reconciles to some extent those apparently diverse 
positions. 
In many cases the domicile concept provides a vehicle for pre-
serving jurisdiction in the established home state when the child 
has been recently removed.135 On the other hand, the physical pres-
ence rule is used by a number of courts as a device for retaining 
jurisdiction in the state where the child has an established home 
but not a domicile.186 
133 See Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 190-91 (1962); cases collected in 17A AM. JUR. 
Divorce and Separation § 818 (1942). 
134 The established home principle refers to allocation of custody jurisdiction to the 
established home state or to alternative jurisdictions, as herein discussed. 
135 Kugle v. Harpe, 234 Ala. 494, 176 So. 617 (1937); Foster v. Foster, 8 Cal. 2d 719, 
68 P.2d 719 (1937); In re Simpson, 87 Cal. App. 2d 848, 197 P.2d 820 (1948); McMillin 
v. McMillin, 114 Colo. 247, 158 P.2d 444 (1945); Breene v. Breene, 51 Colo. 342, 117 Pac. 100 
(1911); Minick v. Minick, Ill Fla. 469, 149 So. 483 (1933); Taylor v. Jeter, 33 Ga. 195, 
(1862); Heard v. Heard, 323 Mass. 357, 82 N.E.2d 219 (1948); Glass v. Glass, 260 Mass. 
562, 157 N.E. 621 (1927); Beckman v. Beckman, 218 S.W.2d 566 (Mo. 1949); People ex rel. 
Allen v. Allen, 40 Hun 611 (N.Y. 1886); Chapman v. Walker, 144 Okla. 83, 289 
Pac. 740 (1930); Hughes v. Hughes, 180 Ore. 575, 178 P.2d 170 (1947); Commonwealth v. 
Camp, 150 Pa. Super. 649, 29 A.2d 363 (1942): Commonwealth v. Rahal, 48 Pa. D. & C. 
568 (1942); Shaw v. Shaw, 114 S.C. 300, 103 S.E. 526 (1920); Cusack v. Cusack, 107 S.W.2d 
1021 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); State ex rel. Marthens v. Superior Court, 25 Wash. 2d 125, 
169 P.2d 626 (1946); Jones v. Mccloud, 19 Wash. 2d 314, 142 P.2d 397 (1943); In re 
Burns, 194 Wash. 293, 77 P.2d 1025 (1938); Motichka v. Rollands, 144 Wash. 565, 258 
Pac. 333 (1927). 
136 Slack v. Perrine, 9 App. D.C. 128 (Ct. App. 1896); Kelsey v. Greene, 69 Conn. 291, 37 
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In most cases denying recognition to a foreign custody decree, 
the child's established home at the time of the petition and decree 
was not in the initial forum, 137 while in almost all of the decisions 
barring a loser with unclean hands from litigating in a second 
forum the child's established home remained in the first forum.188 
The decision in Sampsell had the effect of allowing the estab-
lished home state to exercise custody jurisdiction although the 
child had been permanently removed before proceedings were 
begun. The father petitioned for custody in California, where the 
established family home was located, three months after the mother 
had removed the child to Nevada.139 The mother then obtained 
a Nevada divorce and custody decree by default,140 which she 
Atl. 679 (1897); Little v. Franklin, 40 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 1949); White v. White, 214 Ind. 405, 
15 N.E.2d 86 (1938); Barnett v. Blakley, 202 Iowa I, 207 N.W. 412 (1926); Schmidt v. 
Schmidt, 280 Mass. 216, 182 N.E. 374 (1932); In re Stockman, 71 Mich. 180, 38 N.W. 876 
(1888); Hanrahan v. Sears, 72 N.H. 71, 54 Atl. 702 (1903); Kovacs v. Brewer, 245 N.C. 
630, 97 S.E.2d 96 (1957); In re Strininger, 260 Ohio Op. 4, 11 Ohio Supp. 60 (1940); Heide 
v. Kiskaddon, 79 Okla. 6, 190 Pac. 859 (1920); Commonwealth ex rel. Rogers v. Daven, 
298 Pa. 416, 148 Atl. 524 (1930); Wilkins' Guardian, 146 Pa. 585, 23 Atl. 325 (1892): 
Kenner v. Kenner, 139 Tenn. 211, 201 S.W. 779 (1917): Duncan v. Duncan, 197 S.W.2d 
229 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946); Re Gay, 59 Ont. L. 40, 3 D.L.R. 349 (1926); see STUMBERG, 
op. dt. supra note 74, at 327 n.20. 
137 Langan v. Langan, 150 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1945); People v. Madden, 104 Colo. 252, 
90 P.2d 621 (1939); Boardman v. Boardman, 135 Conn. 124, 62 A.2d 521 (1948); Little v. 
Franklin, 40 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 1949); Elliott v. Elliott, 181 Ga. 545, 182 S.E. 845 (1935); 
Brandon v. Brandon, 154 Ga. 661, 115 S.E. 115 (1922); Shorter v. Williams, 74 Ga. 539 
(1885); Griffin v. Harmon, 35 Ga. App. 40, 132 S.E. 108 (1926); Duryea v. Duryea, 46 
Idaho 512, 269 Pac. 987 (1928); Weber v. Redding, 200 Ind. 448, 163 N.E. 269 (1928); 
Barnett v. Blakley, 202 Iowa 1, 209 N.W. 412 (1926); Kline v. Kline, 57 Iowa 386, 10 
N.W. 825 (1881); Kruse v. Kruse, 150 Kan. 946, 96 P.2d 849 (1939); Woodall v. Alexander, 
107 Kan. 632, 193 Pac. 185 (1920); Pinney v. Sulzen, 91 Kan. 407, 137 P. 987 (1914); In re 
Volk, 254 Mich. 25, 235 N.W. 854 (1931); In re Stockman, 71 Mich. 180, 38 N.W. 876 (1888); 
McAdams v. McFerron, 180 Miss. 644, 178 So. 333 (1938); In re Reed, 152 Neb. 819, 43 
N.W.2d 161 (1950); Brown v. Parsons, 136 N.J. Eq. 493, 42 A.2d 852 (Ct. Err. &: App. 1945); 
In re Erving, 109 N.J. Eq. 294, 157 Atl. 161 (Ch. 1931); Casteel v. Casteel, 45 N.J. Super. 
338, 132 A.2d 529 (Super. Ct. 1957); People ex rel. Herzog v. Morgan, 287 N.Y. 317, 39 
N.E.2d 255 (1942); Elkins v. Elkins, 268 App. Div. 938, 51 N.Y.S.2d 277 (1944); Pickle 
v. Pickle, 215 App. Div. 38, 213 N.Y. Supp. 70 (1925): Black v. Black, 110 Ohio St. 392, 
144 N.E. 268 (1924); Heide v. Kiskaddon, 79 Okla. 6, 190 P. 859 (1920); Wilson v. Wilson, 
136 Va. 643, 118 S.E. 270 (1923). 
138 State v. Black, 239 Ala. 644, 196 So. 713 (1940); Kugle v. Harpe, 234 Ala. 494, 176 
So. 617 (1937); Bums v. Shapley, 16 Ala. App. 297, 77 So. 447 (1917): In re Simpson, 87 
Cal. App. 2d 848, 197 P.2d 820 (1948); Evans v. Evans, 314 P.2d 291 (Colo. 1957); 
Crocker v. Crocker, 122 Colo. 49, 219 P.2d 311 (1950); McMillin v. McMillin, 114 Colo. 
247, 158 P.2d 444 (1945). Taylor v. Jeter, 33 Ga. 195 (1862); Shippen v. Bailey, 303 Ky. 10, 
196 S.W.2d 425 (1946); In re Hubbard, 82 N.Y. 90 (1880); Chapman v. Walker, 144 Okla. 
83, 289 Pac. 740 (1930); Cecil v. State ex rel. Cecil, 192 Tenn. 74, 237 S.W .2d 558 (1951); 
State ex rel. French v. French, 182 Tenn. 606, 188 S.W .2d 603 (1945); Wilson v. Elliott, 
96 Tex. 472, 75 S.W. 368 (1903); Mauldin v. Buchanan, 198 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1946); In re Mullins, 26 Wash. 2d 419, 174 P.2d 790 (1946); In re Bums, 194 Wash. 293, 
77 P .2d 1025 (1938). 
139 The mother apparently received notice in Nevada. 
140 The father apparently received notice in California. 
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pleaded as a bar in the California action. Four months later she 
took the child to Utah and remarried. When the trial court ruled 
that it lacked jurisdiction to determine custody pendente lite, the 
father petitioned for mandamus.141 Assuming the truth of his al-
legation that the mother and child remained California domicili-
aries while in Nevada,142 the state supreme court held that Cal-
ifornia was "not deprive[ d] ... of jurisdiction over the child" by 
the Nevada decree, "for the state of domicile, where the child has 
lived most of its life, clearly has as substantial an interest in the 
child's welfare as a state in which the child's presence was merely 
temporary. " 143 
Although speaking in terms of domicile and comparative state 
interest, the court thus emphasized the importance of the child's 
home as a factor in allocating custody jurisdiction. Under the 
Restatement view, apparently followed in California,144 that a 
child takes the domicile not of its father but of the possessing 
parent, the child may in fact have been domiciled in Nevada with 
its mother when the father petitioned for custody.145 In that event 
California's jurisdiction could be supported only on the established 
home principle.146 
141 The interlocutory order was not appealable before final judgment and no other 
adequate remedy was available to test his right to a hearing on the issue of custody 
pending trial. 32 Cal. 2d 763, 772-73, 197 P.2d 739, 746 (1948). 
142 This allegation was made by the father in his petition for custody pendente lite 
and in his petition for mandamus. The mother demurred to the mandamus petition. 
143 32 Cal. 2d 763, 780-81, 197 P.2d 739, 751 (1948). (Emphasis added.) 
144 32 Cal. 2d 763, 773-74, 197 P.2d 739, 746-47 (1948). 
HIS The father alleged that the Nevada domicile was fraudulent and that the mother 
remained domiciled in California until she arrived in Utah because on leaving she had 
told him she was going to remarry and live in Utah after obtaining a Nevada divorce. See 
GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 88, at 60. In fact, she lived in Nevada with the child for about 
7½ months, which was substantially longer than the six weeks residence required for the 
divorce, before remarrying in Utah, and she never returned to California. If she went 
to Nevada intending to live there until her remarriage at some future time, a court 
could reasonably find she was domiciled in Nevada until she moved to Utah. Id. at 64. 
A peremptory writ of mandate was issued by the supreme court directing the trial 
court to exercise jurisdiction in the custody proceedings, but presumably that court 
would first determine whether the mother and child in fact remained domiciled in 
California after going to Nevada. 
140 The opinion also states that the mother consented to California's jurisdiction 
over her person by answering the initial custody petition without objection to juris-
diction but that such consent could not extend to jurisdiction over "subject matter" 
which was the issue before the court. 32 Cal. 2d 763, 773, 197 P.2d 739, 746 (1948). (Al-
though the mother pleaded the Nevada decree as a bar to the initial petition she did 
not explicitly urge lack of jurisdiction until the father requested custody pendente lite.) 
But cf. note 117 supra and accompanying text; cases indicating that a court with "in 
personam" jurisdiction over the parents has authority to determine custody of a child 
neither domiciled nor present in the state, collected in Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 440 n.17 
(1950); Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 7, 30-31, 64, 78-79, 93-94 (1949). Established home jurisdiction 
would be reinforced by consent of the mother. 
826 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
Use of the established home principle to determine custody ju-
risdiction does not offend previously developed constitutional stand-
ards for allocation of "in personam" jurisdiction among the states. 
The tentative Supreme Court position, as manifested by the 
May plurality opinion, is a rudimentary application of Pennoyer 
v. Neff to child custody cases, the parent-child relationship being 
treated as a disputed claim resolvable where the defendant is 
"present" rather than as a "res" disposable at the child's domicile. 
But the underlying premise of Pennoyer, that a state lacks power 
to impose personal obligations upon someone neither domiciled, 
resident, nor served within its boundaries,141 is not consistent with 
the structure of the federal system. A state does have power to de-
termine the personal obligations of an individual not there "pres-
ent" if the Constitution, backed by federal authority, makes the 
determination binding throughout the country. In International 
Shoe,148 unmentioned in May, the Supreme Court declared that a 
state could exercise jurisdiction over an absent defendant who had 
"minimum contacts" with it sufficient to satisfy "traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial justice." Other Supreme Court 
decisions ignored by May had held that a nonresident motoristt<t0 
and a nonresident securities dealer150 who were neither domiciled, 
resident, nor served in the forum state could be personally subject 
to its jurisdiction in litigation arising out of activities which they 
had carried on there, in the latter case through agents. More re-
cently the Court has applied the principle to a mail order insur-
ance company whose agents were never in the forum state.151 
A child's residence at an established home constitutes a kind 
of parental "activity" in that state probably sufficient to provide 
the minimum contact necessary to subject an absent parent to its 
custody jurisdiction without offending traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice. These notions are particularized in 
the due process values heretofore discussed, and a defendant neces-
sarily has an adequate contact with a venue that substantially im-
plements them. Conventional jurisdictional rules requiring a 
plaintiff to sue where the defendant is located often reflect a sound 
policy of inhibiting unfounded nuisance suits, easily filed at the 
plaintiff's residence, but that policy has little relevance to initial 
14.7 Assuming no consent to the jurisdiction. 
14.8 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 320 (1945). 
14.9 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). 
150 Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935). 
151 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). 
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custody litigation, and the plaintiff gains no unfair advantage from 
an established home forum. 
Jurisdiction based upon the established home principle is no 
less consistent with due process of law than jurisdiction based upon 
the domicile or the physical presence of the child. The evanescent 
"res" that appears to hover at the domicile or to permeate the child 
may also be found to frequent the established home by a sensitive 
judicial medium. If the "res" will not materialize and concepts of 
fairness and justice must be substituted as the due process test of 
jurisdiction, a state where the child is domiciled or physically 
present cannot be said to provide a fairer venue for a nonresident 
parent than the state of the child's established home. 
The Supreme Court, in delineating constitutional require-
ments for divorce jurisdiction, has declared that "judicial power 
to grant a divorce ... is founded on domicile."152 The established 
home concept can perform a similar function in child custody liti-
gation. The six-month test for acquisition of an established home 
may suggest a legislative solution, perhaps in the form of a uniform 
act or even a congressional statute, 153 but the derivation of such a 
jurisdictional formula is not beyond the judicial capacity. By 
limiting divorce jurisdiction to the "matrimonial" domicile, the 
Supreme Court of an earlier day made the fault of the spouses a 
jurisdictional criterion.154 More recently a federal court of appeals 
has discerned a due process objection to divorce jurisdiction based 
upon domicile presumed from a short residence.155 The vagueness 
of these jurisdictional limitations, when compared to a six-month 
residence requirement for the creation of an established home, 
does not make the latter a less appropriate judicial norm. 
152 See Rice v. Rice, 336 U.S. 674 (1949); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 
(1945); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942); Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 
562 (1906); Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903); Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175 (1901); 
Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155 (1901). 
153 Since the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment provides a limitation 
upon the exercise of state judicial authority, Congress, pursuant to its power to enforce 
by appropriate legislation the provisions of that amendment, could probably specify 
such a requirement for the exercise of state custody jurisdiction over nonresidents. Con• 
gress, acting pursuant to its power under article IV, § I, to prescribe the effect 
in each state of the properly proved judicial proceedings of other states, could probably 
specify full faith and credit protection for judgments meeting such a jurisdictional 
requirement. 
1154 Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906); Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155 
(1901). See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942); RFsrATEMENT, CoNFucr OF 
LA.ws § 113 (1934). 
155 Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953). See also Jennings v. Jennings, 251 Ala. 
73, 36 So. 2d 236 (1948). 
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The custody decree of a court whose jurisdiction is supported 
by the established home principle156 ought to receive the protection 
of the full faith and credit clause. That clause compels interstate 
recognition of a divorce decreed by the plaintiff's domiciliary 
state, 157 the finding of domicile being as binding in other jurisdic-
tions as it is in the forum upon a defendant who participated in the 
proceedings.158 Surely the constitutional policies of res judicata 
and interstate respect are significant in the adjustment of the parent-
child relationship as well as the dissolution of the marital relation-
ship. To discourage abduction, to limit the waste in individual and 
social resources involved in relitigation, to provide greater psy-
chological stability for the child, to protect the reasonable expecta-
tions of the prevailing parent, and to promote federal cohesion, 
each state should accept and enforce the valid custody determina-
tions of every other state without readjudicating previously de-
cided issues.159 
156 See note 134 supra. 
157 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942). See cases cited in note 158 infra. 
158 Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Davis v. 
Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1938). Such a decree, including the finding of domicile, also has the 
same immunity in other states from attack by third persons that it has in the forum. 
Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951); Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951). In Williams 
v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945), the finding of domicile was held subject to attack 
by a state in a bigamy prosecution against a plaintiff who had returned and remarried 
after obtaining a divorce elsewhere, but the decree was by default, and the jurisdictional 
issue was therefore not res judicata. Whether such a prosecuting state could attack the 
jurisdictional finding of domicile by the divorce forum when the defending spouse had 
appeared in the divorce proceedings remains uncertain. Allocation of divorce jurisdiction 
resolves the question of choice of law as well as of fair venue, because the forum usually 
applies its own grounds for divorce. The interest of the state of the marital residence in 
specifying the grounds for dissolution of the marriage may be of sufficient dimension to 
justify an independent canvass of the domicile issue in a bigamy prosecution, but the 
security of status provided by recognition in all proceedings of non-default divorce decrees 
is of such importance to the parties, their subsequent spouses, their children, and the 
community as probably to linrlt the scope of the criminal sanction. No equivalent choice 
of law issue arises in child custody litigation. See note 185 infra. But cf. Comment, 73 
YALE L.J. 134 (1963). 
159 See text accompanying notes 75, 81-85, 91-100 supra. 
Issues that can be relitigated in the initial forum may be relitigated by a court having 
modification jurisdiction without violating full faith and credit. See Kovacs v. Brewer, 
356 U.S. 604 (1958). But most jurisdictions apply res judicata principles to their own 
custody decrees. See GoonRICH, CONFLICT OF LA.ws 422-23 (3d ed. 1949). Sampsell v. 
Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 779, 197 P.2d 739, 750 (1948). 
The finding of jurisdiction should be res judicata in other states if the defendant 
participated in the initial proceedings. See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Baldwin 
v. Iowa State Travelling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931). The jurisdictional finding 
in a default decree is subject to attack in the enforcing state. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 
U.S. 714 (1878); Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457 (1874). 
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Although a court with jurisdiction to modify a decree neces-
sarily has a broad discretion, application of the full faith and credit-
res judicata principle in such proceedings gives the prevailing 
parent the benefit of the previous findings, narrows the area of liti-
gation, and imposes upon the petitioner the burden of proving a 
change in circumstances sufficient to overturn the prior ad judica-
tion. 
The Finality Problem 
A half-century ago the Supreme Court decided that the full 
faith and credit clause did not compel recognition and enforce-
ment of prospectively modifiable foreign alimony decrees nor of 
alimony accrued under retroactively modifiable decrees, because 
they were not "final" judgments; only accrued installments not 
subject to further change could command full faith and credit en-
forcement.160 But the chief consequence of the finality requirement 
was evasion of support obligations, and in 1944 the Court indicated 
in Barber v. Barber161 that the application of full faith and credit 
to modifiable alimony decrees was still an open question, stating: 
"[I]t is unnecessary to consider whether a decree or judgment 
for alimony already accrued, which is subject to modification 
or recall in the forum which granted it, but is not yet so modi-
fied, is entitled to full faith and credit until such time as it is 
modified." 
Justice Jackson, concurring, declared: 
"[T]he judgment ... was entitled to faith and credit ... even 
if it was not a final one. . . . Neither the full faith and credit 
clause of the Constitution nor the Act of Congress implement-
ing it says anything about final judgments .... Both require 
that full faith and credit be given to 'judicial proceedings' 
without limitation as to finality .... If a later decree is made 
which modifies or amends the judgment, that modification or 
amendment will also be entiled to faith and credit .... "162 
In none of the child custody cases, all decided after Barber, did 
the Court determine whether lack of finality was an obstacle to full 
160 Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1910); Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U.S. 183 (1901); Barber 
v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1858). 
161 323 U.S. 77, 81 (1944). The Court held that full faith and credit was due a presum-
ably non-modifiable judgment for alimony accrued under a retroactively modifiable 
decree. 
162 323 U.S. 77, 86-87 (1944). See also Justice Rutledge dissenting in Griffin v. 
Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 246-47 (1946). But cf. Rutledge concurring in Halvey v. Halvey, 
330 U.S. 610, 620-21 (1947). 
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faith and credit enforcement of custody decrees. Any definitive 
statement as to the effect of the full faith and credit clause on such 
decrees was studiously avoided in Halvey, Kovacs, and Ford. In 
May the dissenters, by approving full faith and credit enforcement 
in Ohio of the Wisconsin decree, necessarily rejected the finality 
requirement; the plurality opinion may have tacitly done so to the 
extent that it supported full faith and credit enforcement of cus-
tody decrees based on conventional "in personam" jurisdiction. 
As suggested by Justice Jackson, finality is not a sensible 
full faith and credit requirement. When a judgment is subject to 
modification, it should be enforceable until modified. Present 
rights are not ordinarily denied recognition because they may be al-
tered by future judicial action. If a later modification occurs, new 
rights will then supersede the old ones, but the possibility of such 
an adjudication should not vitiate existing rights before they are 
changed.163 
The real issue raised by enforcement of modifiable judgments 
is the fairness under due process standards of leaving a defendant 
with a perhaps uncollectible claim for recoupment if he is required 
to satisfy an obligation that is later judicially negated. Any unfair-
ness, however, can be remedied without denying full faith and 
credit to the judgment by permitting the defendant to assert his 
modification claim in the enforcement proceedings, provided the 
forum is a fair venue for litigating that issue. 
Jurisdiction To Enforce v. Jurisdiction To Modify 
Two years after undermining the finality doctrine in Barber 
the Supreme Court held in Griffin v. Griffin164 that due process re-
quires the defendant be given an opportunity to request modi-
fication during proceedings in the original forum to enforce collec-
tion of accrued but retroactively modifiable alimony installments. 
The Court also suggested that the installments were en-
forceable by that procedure in other jurisdictions but did 
163 When a plaintiff seeks to enforce a foreign judgment while an appeal is pending, 
perhaps by asserting it as a cross claim in an action brought by the defendant in another 
state, the most efficacious procedure is to stay the new proceedings until the appeal is 
decided. Talk about finality largely obscures the problem. See Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 984 
(1950); Note, 41 CoLUM. L. REv. 878 (1941). Likewise, if modification proceedings are 
pending in the initial jurisdiction, a foreign court may stay the enforcement of a custody 
decree to await the outcome. Even after appeal judgments may not be finally final 
because subject to collateral attack but are generally enforceable subject to defenses 
available in the initial forum. See 30A AM. JuR. Judgments §§ 935, 939 (1958); cf. 
Christmas v. Russell, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 290 (1866); Levin v. Gladstein, 142 N.C. 482, 55 
S.E. 371 (1906). 
164 327 U.S. 220 (1945). 
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not specify whether such enforcement is compelled by full faith 
and credit.165 Thereafter the Supreme Court of Illinois held that 
full faith and credit requires recognition and enforcement of pro-
spectively modifiable foreign alimony decrees,166 and the Supreme 
Court of California declared such decrees, whether prospectively 
or retroactively modifiable, enforceable on comity grounds pro-
vided claims for modification are first considered.167 
The enforcing state is clearly a fair venue for litigating modi-
fication of a foreign alimony decree when both parties reside there. 
It may, however, be unfair to require a nonresident plaintiff to 
litigate modification where she finds the defaulting defendant, be-
cause that issue usually involves a far more extensive contest than 
does enforcement of the decree. In such situations, upon plaintiff's 
objection to the modification jurisdiction of the enforcing court, 
perhaps that court should stay the proceedings until the defendant 
has had a reasonable time in which to request modification in a 
venue fair to plaintiff.168 Litigating in another forum is, of course, 
inconvenient for defendant, but a defendant in default under a 
valid decree should not be able, by his act of default, to control 
the modification venue to the prejudice of the plaintiff. The 
burden should be his to seek modification in an appropriate forum 
if he desires to change his duly adjudicated obligations.169 
Griffin implies that authority to enforce a retroactively modi-
fiable foreign alimony decree necessarily includes authority to 
modify it. In Halvey and Kovacs the Supreme Court used language 
suggesting the same rule applies to child custody decrees without 
considering the differences between custody and alimony. Speaking 
in terms of full faith and credit rather than due process the Court 
stated in Halvey: 
165 In a New York ex parte proceeding the plaintiff obtained a money judgment for 
accrued alimony installments preliminary to execution. The Supreme Court held that 
failure to give the defendant notice and an opportunity to request permissible modifica-
tion violated due process, making the ex parte judgment unenforceable in the District 
of Columbia, but suggested the accrued installments might be enforceable pursuant to 
the original New York alimony decree if the defendant's claim for modification were 
heard by the District of Columbia court. 
106 Light v. Light, 12 III. 2d 502, 147 N.E.2d 35 (1957). 
167 Worthley v. Worthley, 44 Cal. 2d 465, 283 P .2d 19 (1955). See also UNIFORM 
RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT. 
168 Since such a stay necessarily involves delay in enforcement of at least part of 
the defendant's alimony obligation, plaintiff may choose not to object to the modification 
jurisdiction of the enforcing court. 
100 Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Griffin, referred to the possibility of absten-
tion by the enforcing court pending modification in the initial jurisdiction. 327 U.S. 220, 
250 (1946). 
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"So far as full faith and credit is concerned, what Florida 
could do in modifying the decree, New York may do .... It 
· is clear that the state of the forum has at least as much leeway 
to disregard the judgment, to qualify it, or to depart from it 
as does the State where it was rendered."170 
The protection that full faith and credit can afford child cus-
tody decrees is minimal if jurisdiction to modify such decrees auto-
matically accompanies authority to enforce them. If a loser who 
withholds the child may request modification of the decree when 
the winner petitions to enforce it, application of the res judicata 
principle does not so significantly inhibit abduction and repeated 
litigation. While explicit redetermination of old issues is fore-
closed, implicit reconsideration of the entire controversy may occur 
in the guise of an evaluation of subsequent or previously unliti-
gated events.171 Even if the res judicata policy were everywhere 
scrupulously observed, the opportunity to seek modification in a 
new jurisdiction by taking the child there would remain inviting. 
Jurisdiction to modify a foreign custody decree is not a neces-
sary concomitant of authority to enforce the decree. Jurisdiction 
to modify is limited by due process requirements; those require-
ments, implementing the social objectives previously discussed, 
indicate that the venue for modification should, whenever possible, 
be at the child's established home. Although both parties are before 
the enforcing court, it is not usually a convenient forum to the 
prevailing parent for litigating the more complex issue of modi-
fication, and by initiating enforcement proceedings there that 
parent ordinarily does not intend consent to its modification juris-
diction. Consent implies voluntary acceptance of the authority of 
a court, 172 and the plaintiff seeks only to enforce the decree in ac-
170 330 U.S. 610, 614 (1947). In Kovacs the Court stated: "Whatever effect the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause may have with respect to custody decrees, it is clear, as the 
Court stated in Halvey, 'that the State of the forum has at least as much leeway to 
disregard the judgment, to qualify it, or to depart from it as does the State where it was 
rendered.' " 356 U.S. 604, 607 (1958). 
Despite their broad language, neither Halvey nor Kovacs definitively holds that an 
enforcing state may always modify, in accordance with the law of the initial jurisdiction, a 
foreign custody decree. The basic issue of due process jurisdiction to modify passed vir-
tually unnoticed in both, and in Kovacs the enforcing and modifying state, where the 
child had been living for over four years, was the established home. See text accompany-
ing notes 26, 36 supra. 
171 See Morrill v. Morrill, 83 Conn. 479, 77 Atl. I (1910); EHRENZWEIG, CoNFUCT OF 
LAws 283-84 (1959); Stansbury, Custody and Maintenance Across State Lines, 10 LAw &: 
CONTEMP, PROB, 819, 830 (1944). 
172 See REsrATEMENT, CONFUCT OF LAws § 81 (1934). 
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cordance with constitutional requirements, not to change it.173 
The full faith and credit clause need not authorize an enforcing 
state to modify a decree when due process factors suggest that 
determination should be made by another forum.174 
Due process does not require that the losing parent be allowed 
to request modification during enforcement proceedings because, 
in contrast to the alimony cases, the loser is not unfairly prejudiced 
by a decree ordering the child returned to the winner pending a 
request for modification in a more appropriate forum. A custody 
decree is necessarily subject only to prospective modification; a 
child cannot be removed retroactively from the possession of a 
parent. Judicially compelled compliance with an existing decree 
thus does not involve enforcement of rights which may later be in-
validated. The prevailing parent is entitled to possession of the 
child until the decree is modified. Enforcement without modifica-
tion preserves the rights of the winner and works no unfair hard-
ship on the loser, who is free to request modification in a court 
having jurisdiction.175 
The enforcing court retains authority to protect the child 
against mistreatment or abuse, but authority to modify is not 
needed to provide such protection.176 Upon a substantial showing 
by the defendant that the child may suffer serious harm if returned 
to the prevailing parent, the court can stay the enforcement pro-
ceedings until the defendant has had a reasonable time in which 
to petition for modification in a proper forum. 
Perhaps, however, a plaintiff may be subjected to the modi-
fication jurisdiction of an enforcing state as a condition to initiat-
ing enforcement proceedings there. The Supreme Court said in 
Adams v. Saenger: 
"There is nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment to pre-
vent a state from adopting a procedure by which a judgment 
in personam may be rendered in a cross-action against a plain-
11a As to the authority of an enforcing state to require submission to its modification 
jurisdiction as a condition of enforcement, see text accompanying notes 177-82 infra. 
174 See text accompanying notes 91, 171 supra and note 182 infra. If, however, plain-
tiff does not object to litigating the modification issue in the enforcing court, the juris-
diction of that tribunal to modify, being soundly based upon consent, accords with 
due process requirements. 
175 See Crocker v. Crocker, 122 Colo. 49, 219 P.2d 311 (1950); French v. French, 182 
Tenn. 606, 188 S.W .2d 603 (1945); Marthens v. Superior Court, 25 Wash. 2d 125, 169 
P.2d 626 (1946); Jones v. McCloud, 19 Wash. 2d 314, 142 P.2d 397 (1943); In re Bums, 
194 Wash. 293, 77 P.2d 1025 (1938); Motichka v. Rollands, 144 Wash. 565, 258 Pac. 333 
(1927). 
176 See note 88 supra. 
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tiff in its courts, upon service of process or of appropriate 
pleadings upon his attorney. The plaintiff having, by his 
voluntary act in demanding justice from the defendant, sub-
mitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court, there is nothing 
arbitrary or unreasonable in treating him as being there for 
all purposes for which justice to the defendant requires his 
presence. It is the price which the state may exact as the condi-
tion of opening its courts to the plaintiff .... "177 
This language recognizes a broad authority in each state to 
subject a nonresident plaintiff to its jurisdiction on a cross-action 
by the defendant, but the authority is not unlimited. Such a condi-
tion may be imposed upon the plaintiff "for all purposes for which 
justice to the defendant requires his presence." If justice to the 
defendant does not require that the cross-claim be then litigated, 
the condition does not meet the A dams test. 
In Adams plaintiff's unadjudicated claim for money was coun-
tered by defendant's unadjudicated claim for money. As in the 
case of retroactively modifiable alimony, there is an element of un-
fairness in compelling a defendant to pay money without asserting 
his cross-claim for money, because a later judgment on the cross-
claim obtained at the plaintiff's residence may be then uncollectible. 
Furthermore, the accessibility of the evidence is usually about the 
same at either residence, and the forum is not likely to be more 
inconvenient to plaintiff for litigating one claim than the other. 
Even if the claims arise from different occurrences, there may well 
be an overlapping of issues, and the account between the parties 
can probably be settled in the one lawsuit. A requirement that off-
setting monetary claims be litigated together, therefore, does justice 
to the defendant and is not unfair to the plaintiff.178 On the other 
hand, in custody disputes as previously pointed out, justice to the 
losing parent seldom requires that modification be litigated in an 
enforcing court while justice to the prevailing parent, as well as to 
the child, often prescribes a different forum for the trial of that 
issue. 
A dams did not deal with a cross-claim in response to an action 
on a valid foreign judgment. In such cases the plaintiff's claim is 
reinforced by the duty of the forum to give full faith and credit to 
the prior decision. A state may not avoid that constitutional man-
177 303 U.S. 59, 67-68 (1938). 
178 If plaintiff is unable to prove his case after bringing the action, it is not unreason-
able to permit an affirmative recovery by defendant on the cross complaint. 
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date by limiting the jurisdiction of its courts,179 nor by any un-
reasonable condition.180 Necessarily, therefore, a state may subject 
a nonresident plaintiff to a cross-claim by the defendant as a condi-
tion to the full faith and credit enforcement of a foreign judgment 
only if the forum constitutes a fair venue for trial of defendant's 
claim in accordance with due process requirements. Consequently, 
unless custody decrees are in a less favored category, a prevailing 
parent cannot be subjected to modification jurisdiction as a condi-
tion to enforcement of a valid custody decree when due process 
considerations indicate the issue should be decided elsewhere.181 
The policy of full faith and credit can operate effectively to 
protect custody decrees if authority to enforce such decrees does 
not imply jurisdiction to modify them.182 Valid decrees would then 
be enforceable without change in every state except those having 
modification jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction, if based on the estab-
lished home concept, would provide a venue fair to both parties in 
a court with optimum access to the relevant evidence, and adher-
179 Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, 252 U.S. 411 (1920). 
180 See Union Nat'! Bank v. Lamb, 337 U.S. 38 (1949); Milwaukee County v. M. E. 
Wbite Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935); Roche v. McDonald, 275 U.S. 449 (1928); Kentucky Finance 
Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exch., 262 U.S. 544 (1923); Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, supra 
note 179; Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U.S. 197 (1914); Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 
U.S. 230 (1908); cf. Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954). See also 
First Nat'! Bank v. United Airlines, 342 U.S. 396 (1952); Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 
(1951). 
181 Of doubtful present vitality is the anomalous case of York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15 
(1890) upholding the Texas statutory rule that a defendant waives his due process objection 
to the jurisdiction of the forum by appearing there specially to make the objection. See 
also Western Life Indem. Co. v. Rupp, 235 U.S. 261 (1914). See Blair, Constructive 
General Appearance and Due Process, 23 ILL. L. REv. 119, 121-27 (1928); Hearon, 
Non-Resident Defendants and the Special Appearance in Texas, 32 TEXAS L. REv. 78, 
96-100 (1953); 5 UTAH L. REv. 406 (1957). The decision in effect compelled a nonresident 
defendant sued in Texas to give up either his constitutional right to object to the due 
process jurisdiction of the court or his constitutional right to contest on the merits. 
See Jardine v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. 301, 304-05, 2 P.2d 756, 757 (1931). The 
state was thus permitted to condition the exercise of one federal right on the waiver of 
another. This curious result was justified on the ground that the entry of a default 
judgment by a court without due process jurisdiction violates no constitutional rights of 
the defendant. Only when enforcement of the judgment is sought are the defendant's 
rights threatened and full protection is then available through a collateral attack on 
jurisdictional grounds, thought the majority, thus assuming the success of the attack and 
ignoring the loss of a defense on the merits. Overlooked was the effect of an unsatisfied 
judgment on a defendant's business reputation, credit rating, opportunities for employ-
ment, and title to real property later acquired in the forum. See Blair, supra. The fair 
solution is the rule adopted in the federal courts and many states permitting a defendant 
to contest on the merits without waiving jurisdictional objections after they have been 
urged and overruled. Fm. R. CIV. P. 12(b); N.Y. CIV. PRAc. ACT § 237a; N.J. Sup. CT. R. 
3:12-2; Preston v. Legard, 160 Va. 364, 168 S.E. 445 (1933); see Jardine v. Superior Court, 
2U Cal. 301-05, 2 P.2d 756-58 (1931). 
182 See text accompanying notes 91, 171, 174 supra. 
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ence to the res judicata principle would foreclose redetermination 
of previously decided issues. 
Consideration of Prior Unadjudicated Events 
The Supreme Court in Halvey and Kovacs carefully avoided 
deciding whether the full faith and credit clause inhibits the modi-
fication of custody decrees on the basis of facts not admissible in 
the initial jurisdicti9n. While modification may everywhere be 
grounded upon events occurring subsequent to the decree, some 
states, as heretofore indicated, also permit consideration of prior 
but unlitigated events.183 When such prior events are no longer 
admissible in the initial state, perhaps a modifying court whose 
jurisdiction rests upon the established home principle should be 
free to apply its own rule in the exercise of a broad authority to 
safeguard the child's welfare. The policy of full faith and credit 
ought to make the antecedent decree res judicata as to all litigated 
issues but need not forestall evaluation of matters not previously 
considered, whatever the rule in the first forum. 
In Yarborough v. Yarborough184 a seven-to-two majority of the 
Supreme Court decided that a non-modifiable child support decree 
was res judicata as to the extent of the father's support obligation 
and that the state of the child's later residence could not impose 
on the nonresident father an additional support obligation arising 
from subsequent events. But whatever its soundness as to non-modi-
fiable support decrees, the Yarborough holding does not control 
the basis for revision of modifiable custody decrees. A judgment 
that purports to be a final determination of the rights and obli-
gations of the parties may foreclose all future litigation on the 
matter, but the res judicata effect of a decree that is subject to later 
change in other jurisdictions is less sweeping; the second forum 
may be bound by the findings of the first but not necessarily by its 
rules for modification. 
The modifying court has the responsibility of allocating custody 
in accordance with the present needs of the child. So long as that 
court does not relitigate what has already been decided, there ap-
pears to be no constitutional reason why the admissibility of evi-
dence pertinent to the performance of its difficult task should be 
controlled by the prior forum.185 
188 See note 3 supra. 
184 290 U.S. 202 (1933). 
185 The substantive custody rules of all the states rest upon general equitable prin-
ciples relating to the welfare of the child and the natural desire of the parents to enjoy 
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While the congressional full faith and credit statute requires 
that a judgment receive the "same" faith and credit in every state 
as in the state where rendered, 186 the effect of a judicial decision 
cannot always be exactly the same in every state. A judgment that 
"closes the doors" of the forum to a plaintiff without deciding the 
merits of the claim will foreclose further action in the forum but 
not in other jurisdictions.187 Interpreted in the context of the consti-
tutional policy against relitigation, the full faith and credit statute 
can reasonably be construed as requiring a modifying court to 
accept the decision of the prior jurisdiction but not its grounds 
for modification. 
POSTSCRIPT: THE PROBLEM OF CHILD SUPPORT 
Common sense suggests that the extent of a father's obligation 
for child support should be resolved at the time of the custody 
adjudication, and most of the values heretofore discussed confirm 
the established home principle as a sound basis for allocation of 
authority to determine both issues. Application of that principle 
will usually provide a forum for the trial of the support question 
that is fair to both parties and free from the arbitrary control of 
either. A mother left at home with the child can sue a departing 
father in the home state for both custody and support; if the father 
leaves with the child, she may seek such relief in that venue until the 
its society and participate in its upbringing (see note 74 supra). However, the procedures 
involved in making the custody determination are varied. See KEE=, MARRIAGE AND DI-
VORCE 715 (3d ed. 1946); Chute, Divorce and the Family Court, 18 LAw & CoNTEMP. 
PROB. 49 (1953); Lemkin, Orphans of Living Parents, a Comparative Legal and Sociological 
View, 10 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 834 (1943); Comment, Ford v. Ford; Full Faith and 
Credit to Child Custody Decrees, 73 YALE L.J. 134 (1963); Comment, Use of Extra Record 
Information in Custody Cases, 24 U. Cm. L. REv. 349 (1959). The most significant choice 
of law problem concerns the consideration in modification proceedings of prior but un-
Iitigated occurrences. (The issue may be posed as a conflict between the res judicata 
policy of the initial forum, foreclosing future consideration of past events, and the au-
thority of the modifying forum to define the basis for a subsequent change in custody.) 
The established home state probably bears the primary responsibility for providing the 
substantive rules to regulate the child's custody. Should there be a conflict between the 
substantive custody rules of that state and a forum whose jurisdiction rests on consent, 
the former ought to prevail, at least in the absence of an express legislative directive in 
the forum as to the proper choice of law. But the forum has the primary responsibility for 
making a correct adjudication on the basis of the applicable substantive rules and should 
not be restricted in its consideration of evidence that is unadjudicated and unprivileged. 
As to the significance of comparative state interest in allocating jurisdiction, rather 
than choosing the appropriate rules of decision, see notes 87, 115 supra. 
186 28 u.s.c. § 1738 (1958). 
187 For example, a judgment for defendant based upon the statute of limitations or a 
special procedural rule of the forum. See Warner v. Buffalo Drydock Co., 67 F.2d 540 
(2d Cir. 1933). 
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child acquires an established home elsewhere. A mother who de-
parts with the child must proceed in the state that she left to obtain 
custody and support from the father until a new established home 
exists, and within that time the father may request the same forum 
to determine his custody rights and support obligations.188 Such a 
venue will usually provide maximum access to evidence relating 
to the needs of the child and the financial capacity of the resident 
parent, although evidence concerning the resources of the nonresi-
dent parent may in some cases be more readily available in another 
forum.189 
The Pennoyer v. Neff doctrine,190 that authority to issue a 
money judgment depends upon the "presence" of the defendant 
or his property, has been apparently confirmed by the Supreme 
Court as the constitutional test for alimony jurisdiction in language 
broad enough to encompass child support litigation.191 But an 
188 In addition, a defendant may consent to jurisdiction by appearing without objec• 
tion, and a plaintiff may elect to proceed at the defendant's residence. See text accom• 
panying notes 117-19 supra. In lieu of venue in an established home state the alternatives 
heretofore discussed are applicable. See text accompanying notes ll!l-16 supra. 
189 Cf. text accompanying notes 103-06 supra. In most cases the established home prin• 
ciple probably facilitates the litigation of divorce, custody, and child support in the same 
forum. Usually a stay-at-home parent has lived in the home state long enough to petition 
there for divorce, as well as for a determination of custody and child support, before the 
child has acquired a new established home with the departing parent. In the absence of 
such proceedings by the stay-at-home parent, the departing parent can probably petition 
for divorce, custody, and child support in the same forum after satisfying the required 
period of residence for divorce, which in most states is at least six months. When a de• 
parting parent petitions for divorce within six months in a state having a short residence 
requirement, the forum will usually lack jurisdiction to adjudicate either custody or child 
support in the absence of a voluntary appearance by the stay-at-home parent, but such a 
default divorce is of questionable validity if the plaintiff leaves the forum shortly after 
the decree. See Rice v. Rice, 336 U.S. 674 (1949); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 
226 (1945). A court with jurisdiction to adjudicate divorce, custody, and child support 
could reasonably be considered an appropriate forum for the litigation of alimony, as 
well. Of course, either parent may wish to sue for custody and/or a determination of 
child support, but not divorce, and variations in grounds and residence requirements for 
divorce will often inhibit litigation of all issues in the same forum. 
190 See text accompanying note 6 supra. 
191 Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957); Kreiger v. Kreiger, 334 U.S. 555 
(1948); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948). The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Sup• 
port Act, designed to facilitate collection of child support from deserting fathers, rests 
upon this premise; it permits a support adjudication against a father only where he or his 
property is "present." The result is a cumbersome, bifurcated proceeding for the deter-
mination of initial child support: a complaint filed by the mother in the initiating state, 
where she and the child reside, is forwarded to a court of the responding state, where the 
father resides, which determines the custody obligation after considering his evidence and 
a transcipt of the mother's testimony also forwarded by the initiating state. See UNIFORM 
RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT § 9; CHEATHAM, GOODRICH, GRISWOLD &: REEsE, 
CONFLICT OF LAws 849 (1957). The procedures of the act are perhaps more useful in enforc-
ing existing decrees against departed fathers. Enforcement by execution or contempt 
citation generally requires a judgment of the state where the defendant or his property is 
located, but such a judgment need not readjudicate the substantive support issues. 
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adjudication by the established home state of a nonresident father's 
support obligation would not appear to be more offensive to "tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice" than a custody 
determination.192 Not only does an absent father have a "minimum 
contact" with the state where his child habitually resides, but his 
failure to support the child may well constitute a kind of tortious 
activity sufficiently carried on in that state to make it a fair venue 
for enforcing the obligation.193 
Jurisdiction to modify a child support decree involves addi-
tional considerations. A father should petition for reduced support 
in the state where the child has an established home with the 
mother, but a mother who may petition in that state for increased 
support can subject a nonresident father to frequent litigation 
in an inconvenient forum. The importance of inhibiting repeated 
litigation and of providing a fair venue for the father may justify 
the allocation of jurisdiction to the state of his residence when the 
mother requests such modification.194 
When the mother sues at the father's residence to collect sup-
port payments accrued under a retroactively modifiable decree, due 
process requires that the father be heard on the modification issue 
before payment is enforced, 195 but due process does not require 
that a defaulting father be allowed to compel litigation of this 
issue in a forum of his choosing.196 Upon objection to its modifica-
tion jurisdiction by a nonresident mother, the enforcing court can 
stay the proceedings until the father has had sufficient time to re-
quest modification in a venue fair to her.197 If she has also peti-
tioned for enforcement of prospective support payments as they 
102 See text accompanying notes 148-51 supra. 
10s Ibid.; see WSAZ Inc. v. Lyons, 254 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1958); Atkinson v. Superior 
Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957); Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 
673 (1957); EHRENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 171, at 264-65 n.9. The significant differences 
in the substantive rules of the various states concerning the parental obligation to sup-
port a legitimate minor child relate to the age at which the obligation terminates and the 
extent to which the mother shares the obligation with the father. See Commissioner's 
Prefatory Note, UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT, 9C UNIFORM LAws 
.ANNOTATED 10-11 (1957). Because of its interest in the maintenance of the child, the estab-
lished home state may reasonably control these limitations, although the presence of 
other dependents at the father's residence increases the interest of that state in the ap-
portionment of his income. Cf. note 185 supra. As to the significance of comparative state 
interest in allocating jurisdiction, see notes 87, 115 supra. 
104 As to modification (a) before creation of an established home, see text accompany-
ing notes 124-28 supra, (b) after creation of an established home, see text accompanying 
notes 120-23, 129-31 supra, (c) when custody is divided, see text accompanying notes 
132-33 supra. 
lOll See text accompanying note 164 supra. 
106 See text accompanying notes 168, 177-81 supra. 
197 See note 168 supra. 
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accrue, the enforcing court may order reasonable support pending 
final determination of the modification issue. 
THE FUNCTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
IN Ar.LOCATING ] URISDICTION 
The foregoing discussion suggests that in order to develop 
workable rules for the allocation of child custody jurisdiction 
the Supreme Court must articulate the values to be implemented 
by such allocation and apply to each situation principles derived 
from those values. Substantive common-law rules are developed 
by a similar process, but values, principles, and rules formulated 
by the Supreme Court in defining state judicial authority and the 
extraterritorial effect of judgments must be consistent with the 
constitutional text. 
Obviously, the Court can give meaning to the phrases "due 
process of law" and "full faith and credit" only by identifying 
the values it considers implicit in the language. The broad policies 
of fundamental fairness and national unity suggested by these 
clauses become functional guides for allocation of jurisdiction when 
translated in terms of the well-being of the persons affected by the 
litigation, the convenience of the venue, the accessibility of the 
evidence, the consequences of repeated litigation, the reasonable 
expectations of litigants, and the importance of interstate coopera-
tion and respect. As stated by Justice Rutledge, concurring in 
Halvey,198 " ••• the controlling consideration should be the best 
interests of the child, not only for disposing of such cases as a matter 
of local policy ... but also for formulating federal policies of full 
faith and credit as well as of jurisdiction and due process in relation 
to such dispositions .... " 
APPENDIX 
A Restatement of Rules for Custody Jurisdiction Derived 
From the Established Home Principle 
(I) Jurisdiction to make an initial decree regulating the custody of a 
child may be exercised by the state where the child's established home 
is located at the time proceedings are begun, provided the child or one of 
the parties claiming custody resides there. 
(2) A child has an established home at the last place where it resided for 
at least six months with a parent or a person acting as a parent. 
(3) If the child has no established home, or if neither the child nor any 
198 330 U.S. 610, 620 (1947). 
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person claiming custody resides in the established home state when proceed-
ings are brought, initial custody jurisdiction may be exercised by the state 
where the child's last non-transient abode with both parents is located, 
provided the child or one of the parties claiming custody resides there; if 
they do not, initial custody jurisdiction may be exercised by the state 
where the child resides with a parent, or a person acting as parent,199 at 
the time the proceedings are begun. 
(4) Jurisdiction to modify a custody decree may be exercised by the 
state that issued it until the child acquires an established home elsewhere, 
provided the child or the prevailing parent resides there, or the non-prevail-
ing parent resides there and the prevailing parent has removed the child 
to another state without express court authorization. 
(5) Pending the acquisition of an established home, jurisdiction to 
modify a custody decree may be exercised by the state to which the prevail-
ing parent has taken the child after the decree if the move was expressly 
authorized by the court or if the non-prevailing parent does not reside in 
the state of the decree. After the prevailing parent has moved the child first 
to an authorized state and then to an unauthorized state, but before the 
creation of an established home, the authorized state may exercise modifica-
tion jurisdiction if the non-prevailing parent resides there, and the state of 
the decree may exercise jurisdiction if the non-prevailing parent resides 
there; otherwise the unauthorized state may exercise jurisdiction. 
(6) Jurisdiction to modify a custody decree may be exercised by the state 
where the last established home acquired by the child subsequent to 
the decree is located, provided the child or a party claiming custody resides 
there. 
(7) If each parent is given custody for a part of the year by decree or 
agreement, the child may acquire an established home with the parent 
having the shorter period of custody by continuing to live in the same place 
with that parent for three months after the end of the shorter period, and 
for a total of at least six months, without action by the other parent. If 
each parent is given custody for approximately half the year by decree or 
agreement, jurisdiction to modify the decree or to make an initial disposi-
tion should be exercised by the state in which the child has been residing 
with the petitioning parent for at least nine months without action by the 
defending parent. 
(8) If the non-prevailing parent removes a child in violation of the 
decree and the prevailing parent cannot locate them in time to prevent 
the creation of an established home in a second state, upon a petition to 
enforce the decree that state should return the child to the prevailing parent 
without considering modification if, under the circumstances, the prior 
home state remains a fair venue for litigating the issue. 
100 See note 102 supra and note 200 infra. 
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(9) If neither parent nor the child200 resides in the established home 
state when modification proceedings are begun, jurisdiction to modify may 
be exercised by the state where the last non-transient abode of the child 
and the prevailing parent is located, provided the child or the prevailing 
parent resides there; if they do not, modification jurisdiction may be exer-
cised by the state where the child then resides.201 
(10) Jurisdiction to make or modify a custody decree may be exercised 
by a state with the consent of the parties claiming custody or by a state 
in which the child resides with one of the persons claiming custody when 
proceedings are initiated there by the nonresident claimant. 
(11) No state may exercise jurisdiction to make or modify a custody 
decree if a prior action is pending in a court with jurisdiction. 
(12) A valid custody decree is entitled to full faith and credit enforcement 
in every state. An enforcing court has jurisdiction to modify the decree at 
the request of the defendant only if the above-stated requirements for 
modification jurisdiction are met. 
(13) A modifying court is required by the full faith and credit clause to 
accept the prior decree as res judicata on all previously adjudicated issues 
but may decide for itself whether to consider evidence of events occurring 
before the decree but not presented to the initial court, as well as evidence 
of subsequent events. 
(14) The state where a child is physically present may remove the 
child from the possession of any person who is mistreating or abusing it. 
If, in proceedings to enforce a foreign custody decree, the defendant makes 
a substantial showing that the child may suffer serious harm if returned to 
the plaintiff, the court may stay the proceedings until the defendant has 
had a reasonable time in which to petition for modification in a court with 
jurisdiction. 
Application of Rules to Typical Situations 
In every situation it is assumed that: (1) the defendant has received 
fair notice, (2) a state has jurisdiction when one parent petitions there for 
custody and the other is a resident or appears wihout objecting to the 
jurisdiction, (3) a state does not have jurisdiction if a prior action is pend-
ing in a foreign court with jurisdiction. 
Case A 
After the parents have lived with the child for more than six months in 
state X, one parent removes the child to state Y: 
(I) Until the child has lived in Y for six months, X has jurisdiction to 
determine custody. 
200 The child's residence may be with a person acting as parent if neither parent 
maintains a residence for the child. 
201 This residence may be with the losing parent. 
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(2) Y has jurisdiction to determine custody if: (a) the child has lived 
there for at least six months, or (b) the stay-at-home parent has left X. 
Case B 
After the parents have lived with the child for more than six months in 
state W and then for two months in state X, one parent removes the child 
to state Y: 
(1) Until the child has lived in Y for six months, X has jurisdiction to 
determine custody provided the stay-at-home parent resides there. 
(2) Y has jurisdiction to determine custody if (a) the child has lived 
there for at least six months, or (b) the stay-at-home parent has left X but 
has not returned to W. 
(3) Until the child has lived in Y for six months W has jurisdiction to 
determine custody if the stay-at-home parent has returned there. 
Case C 
After the parents have lived with the child for more than six months 
in state X and then for two months in state Y, one parent returns with the 
child to state X: 
(1) X has jurisdiction to determine custody. 
Case D 
One parent removes the child from its home in state X to state Y and 
permits the child to live for extended periods in a boarding school or with 
relatives in state Z: 
(1) Y has jurisdiction to determine custody after six months or after the 
stay-at-home parent has left X if the child regularly returns to the residence 
of the parent in Y. 
(2) If the parent in Y does not maintain a residence for the child but 
permits the child to remain indefinitely at the school or with the relatives, 
Z has jurisdiction after six months or after the stay-at-home parent has left 
X. 
(3) Until the child has lived in Y or Z for six months, X has jurisdiction 
to determine custody provided the stay-at-home parent resides there. 
Case E 
The losing parent, in violation of a valid custody decree of state X, 
removes the child from state X to state Y. The winner brings habeas corpus 
proceedings in Y to enforce the decree. The loser then requests modifica-
tion on the basis of events occurring after the decree and events occurring 
before the decree but not presented to the court because previously un-
known. In X modification may not be based on prior events. 
(1) Y should give full faith and credit to the X decree by enforcing it 
without relitigating any issues. 
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(2) Y has jurisdiction to modify the decree if the child has lived there 
for six months. In that event Y may decide for itself whether to consider 
the previously unadjudicated events. 
(3) Until the child has lived in Y for six months, X has jurisdiction to 
modify the decree provided the winner still resides there. 
(4) Upon a substantial showing by the loser that the child may suffer 
serious harm if returned to the winner, Y, if it lacks jurisdiction to modify, 
may stay the enforcement proceedings until the loser has had a reasonable 
time in which to petition for modification in X. 
Case F 
Shortly after a valid custody decree in state X, the winner takes the 
child to state Y and three months later to state Z: 
(1) X has jurisdiction to modify until the child has lived in Z for six 
months provided the loser lives in X and the moves to Y and Z were without 
court authorization. 
(2) Y has jurisdiction to modify until the child has lived in Z for six 
months provided the loser lives in Y, the move to Y was authorized, and the 
move to Z was not authorized. 
(3) Z has jurisdiction to modify if the move to Z was authorized or the 
child has lived there for six months or the loser no longer lives in X, nor in 
Y if the move to Y was authorized. 
Case G 
After a valid custody decree in state W, the winner takes the child to 
state X for over six months and then to state Y for three months. The child 
then visits the loser in state Z and is retained there in violation of the 
decree. After three months the winner brings habeas corpus proceedings 
in Z and the loser requests modification: 
(I) Z has jurisdiction to modify if the winner no longer resides in X or Y. 
(2) Y has jurisdiction to modify if the winner still resides there. 
(3) X has jurisdiction to modify if the winner now resides there. 
Case H 
A valid decree of state X gives the mother custody in X for eight months 
of the year and the father custody in Y for four months. After the father 
has retained the child in Y for a total of seven months, he requests and 
obtains a modification in Y, over the mother's objection to the jurisdiction, 
giving each parent custody for half the year. After the mother has retained 
the child in X for seven months the father brings habeas corpus proceed-
ings there. The mother claims the modification was made without jurisdic-
tion and also asks further modification. 
(1) Y had jurisdiction to modify, and the Y decree is entitled to full 
faith and credit enforcement in X. 
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(2) X has no jurisdiction to modify except at the request of the father. 
Y has jurisdiction to modify at the request of the mother. 
Application to Supreme Court Cases 
Had these rules been applied in the Supreme Court cases previously 
discussed, the results would have been as follows: 
In May v. Anderson,202 Wisconsin, the long-established family home, 
had jurisdiction to award custody of the children to the stay-at-home father 
who petitioned promptly after the mother had removed them to Ohio. Ohio 
properly gave full faith and credit to the Wisconsin decree and ordered the 
children returned to the father when the mother retained them in Ohio in 
violation of the decree. Since the established home of the children after the 
decree remained in Wisconsin, Ohio did not have jurisdiction to modify the 
decree in the enforcement proceedings had it offered a procedure for doing 
so. 
In Halvey v. Halvey,203 Florida was the established home and had initial 
custody jurisdiction, because the child had been living there with its mother 
for almost a year when she petitioned for custody. Service on the father, 
however, was by "publication";204 unless such service included delivery of 
notice to him or to his home, it violated due process requirements for fair 
notice and the Florida custody decree was invalid. New York lacked juris-
diction to make or modify a custody decree, because when the father 
retook the child, its established home was still in Florida where the mother 
continued to reside. I£ the father did receive £air notice of the Florida 
proceedings, New York should have given full faith and credit to the Florida 
decree without modification and ordered the child returned to the mother. 
I£ the father did not receive £air notice, New York should have declared the 
decree invalid, but might then have proceeded to determine custody if the 
mother thereupon requested such an adjudication. 
In Kovacs v. Brewer,205 New York did not per se have jurisdiction to 
modify, in favor of the mother, its prior decree, because the child's estab-
lished home was in North Carolina at the time of the request for modifica-
tion, but the father and grandfather consented to New York's jurisdiction 
by contesting without objection to it. The child reacquired an established 
home in North Carolina after the modification by living there another 
fourteen months before the mother petitioned for enforcement. That state 
therefore had jurisdiction to modify on the basis of both subsequent events 
and prior, unlitigated events but could not redetermine £acts previously 
adjudicated. Since evidence of previously litigated as well as of subsequent 
events had been introduced at the hearing, a remand was necessary to per-
202 See note 43 supra. 
203 See note 26 supra. 
204 The opinion does not elucidate this term. 
2011 See note 36 supra. 
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mit a resolution of the modification issue by the North Carolina court solely 
on the basis of the subsequent events. 
In Ford v. Ford206 the full faith and credit clause did not require South 
Carolina to accept as a binding custody decision the Virginia dismissal 
order based on an agreement of the parents favoring the father, because the 
order had decided nothing and was not res judicata under Virginia law. 
The stay-at-home father, however, apparently continued to maintain an 
established home in North Carolina for the children, who had been taken to 
South Carolina by their mother during the summer, and he could have 
soundly objected to the jurisdiction of the South Carolina court. Instead 
he chose to litigate on the merits and was therefore bound by the decree. 
206 See note 39 supra. 
